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GAG LAW 1919

CONGRESSIONAL REACTION TO EXECUTIVE EXPEDIENCY

BY

JACK DONALD McNAMARA

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

1972

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INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER

INTRODUCTION

The senior minority representative of the House Appropriations Committee, James W. Good of Iowa, proposed an amendment to a deficiency appropriation bill on February 28, 1919. The amendment was proposed and adopted on the floor, in the Committee of the Whole House; but it was not signed into law by the President until July 11, 1919. That amendment has become known as the "gag" law and remains a section within the U.S. Code.[1]

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[1] 41 U.S. Stat. 68 (1919); 18 U.S.C. 1913 (1970). Scott M. Cutlip and Allen H. Center, Effective Public Relations 4th ed., (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 546; James L. McCamy, Government Publicity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), p. 7. As will be shown, the term "gag" is a popular reference to the law, not used incident to the passage of the amendment. For ease of usage, quotation marks will not be used. The statute follows:

> "Section 6--That hereafter no part of the money appropriated by this or any other Act shall, in the absence of express authorization by Congress, be used directly or indirectly to pay for any personal service, advertisement, telegram, telephone, letter, printed or written matter or other device intended or designed to influence in any manner a Member of Congress to favor or oppose, by vote or otherwise, any legislation or appropriation by Congress, whether before or after the introduction of any bill or resolution proposing such legislation or appropriation; but this shall not prevent officers and employees of the United States from communicating to Members of Congress, through the official channels, requests for legislation or appropriations which they deem necessary for the efficient

---

[illegible]

The amendment received little public attention at the time. It has received little notice since and there have been no convictions under the statute in any of its original or revised forms. Nevertheless, the conditions of the law's passage and the principles involved are fundamental to the federal principle of separation of powers.

When passed, the amendment made explicit a prohibition of the use of legislatively appropriated funds by federal officials in the promotion of programs pending legislative or appropriative action. The law provided punishment to the degree of removal of the offending official, one year imprisonment, and a fine of $500--a misdemeanor.

The principle involved was one upon which there can be little argument. The people's money will not be used to propagandize the people or their representatives for the purposes of the executive. However, once past the tacit unanimity upon the point of principle, the

---

conduct of the public business.

Any officer or employee of the United States who, after notice and hearing by the superior officer vested with the power of removing him is found to have violated or attempted to violate this section shall be removed by such superior officer from office or employment. Any officer or employee of the United States who violates or attempts to violate this section shall also be guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than $500 or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both."

--41 U.S. Stat. 68 (1919)

parameters of right conduct are not clear. No one has defined the line where meets the government's obligation to inform its citizens and the politician's temptation to proselyte them.

In late February 1919, conditions were such that the Congress found it necessary to attempt such a definition. The experience of the immediately preceding years constituted such a threat to the legislative branch that it was necessary to make the proscription explicit and provide the threat of punishment. The Congress has seen fit to periodically revise and renew the law, even though rigorous enforcement is impracticable.

There is general agreement that the year 1919 marks the beginning of a long period of reaction to wartime expedience and morality. The men who were foremost in the passage of the gag law were also foremost among the reactionaries. They delighted in the latter categorization. But the point remains that if such men were in the vanguard of the reactionary movement, they also likely reflected the sentiments of the electoral majority. The congressional elections of 1918 returned the Republican Party to the majority column and the presidential election of 1920 resulted in a Republican landslide. The 1920 candidate and platform were as much the handiwork of the reactionaries as was the gag law. What, then, were the old, much-abused

standpatters[2] reacting against?

The War Administration of Woodrow Wilson had imposed severe strains upon traditional concepts of federal structure. These strains showed in the state-federal relation, the individual's constitutional guarantees, and especially the legislative-executive relation. From the perspective of the Congress, the reaction was directed at the executive's arrogation of unprecedented powers of administration, appropriation, and information, gained and maintained under pressures of wartime crisis.

What was increasingly apparent to the Congress was that the administration intended to retain and use war emergency methods for domestic, post-war programs. This was not an unreasonable objective in early 1919 since there was no formal peace in Europe and domestic conditions closely resembled those of the recent war. There could be little disagreement between the Wilson Administration and Congress as to the existing chaos at home and abroad.

---

[2]The term standpatter is inseparable from the person of John Joseph Gurley Cannon. In 1902, rounding up votes for his accession to Speaker of the House, he let it be known that his politics were "stand by the status" (Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, p. 118). Cannon's biographer, Blair Bolles, associated the word with the Speaker's poker playing propensities. Whatever the origin, the word came to mean the conservative wing of the Republican Party. The standpatters generally resisted any legislation which threatened the status quo maintaining at the end of the nineteenth century. Toward the end of the Administration of Theodore Roosevelt, the term came to signify "reactionary."

[illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

There was considerable disagreement as to the solution and the means used to achieve it.

Conservative Republicans perceived the political and economic situation as an attempt by the administration to continue the highly effective methods of the war at home. This program was manifested by a continued proliferation of specialized executive agencies and federal officials. With continued high levels of appropriated support and continued information programs, the support of a political majority could be fashioned. Besides the existing Democratic Party, it could be assumed that a substantial number of homeless Progressives and Socialists would form the majority.

The mortal flaw, as it was well realized by the standpatters, was the requirement for the appropriations. They interpreted the November 1918 election message as economy in government. Accordingly, their main theme was the linkage of placeholders to the wastage of public funds. The most wasteful of all, they alleged, were the propagandists.

The standpatters' attack was comprehensive. The War Department and the General Staff were typed as Prussian autocrats, completely insensitive to the constitutional rights of Americans as individuals. The Department of Labor and the United States Employment Service were portrayed as arrogant functionaries subverting the judicial

process in favor of a special class. Implicit in every indictment were strong feelings against George Creel and the Committee on Public Information (CPI). The CPI was used as a symbol of the hypocrisy in the whole process. What was "feedback" to Creel was promotion to his enemies. The point of attack was the federal bureaucrat, not the social units with which he was associated. Only the mavericks attacked organized labor, or the industrialists, or even the professors. The consummate politician did not make the propaganda target explicit--he made the propagandizer himself explicit.

The standpatters used the forum and the vehicle of the Congress. They knew the rules of the legislative assembly and they used them to outmaneuver the Progressives as well as the Democrats, who were generally less inclined to find fault with the Wilson apparatus. In masterful fashion, the Republicans forced Wilson to call a special session seven months early, giving them a forum. They attached their riders to appropriation bills badly needed by the executive. They used the rules of the House to control which issues would be raised and to what degree of specificity. They found the one issue upon which the Congress and the electorate could agree. That issue was the restoration of legislative supremacy over the executive. In the end, that was the meaning of "back to normalcy."

One source of the reaction was certainly partisan politics. More than that, however, the reaction depended upon fundamentally differing perceptions of the constitutionally derived institutions of the legislative and the executive branches. At the highest level of the presidency and the cabinet, the executive was perceived as responsible for an attempt to alter the relation between the individual citizen and the federal government.

The War Department--through the use of the universal selective service, a large federal standing army, the rigorous Articles of War, and involvement in investigations of domestic subversion--had come into the direct exercise of unprecedented powers. The United States Employment Service and the Department of Labor were viewed as pursuing policies which ultimately would change traditional economic and political relationships within the nation. The institutionalization of new programs and bureaucracies threatened the representative-constituent relation. Middle echelon bureaucrats would control the channels of communications and appropriations to new political groupings.

The implications of post-war administration policies were perceived as a threat to the traditional representative process. The wartime expediencies, although a spectacular adventure in centralized administration, were not to be continued.

CHAPTER I

THE OBJECTIVES OF THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE FOR LABOR AND DEMOCRACY

The Committee on Public Information (CPI) was often accused of partisan political activity. The charges were invariably denied. Certainly the potential for partisan activity was present in the far flung organization and broad assessment of mission. The congressional reaction against the committee is a measure of one branch of government's evaluation. In one particular aspect the various individuals involved were able to use the circumstances of the times to develop implicit political objectives. It was these broad domestic political activities which Congress reacted against in the passage of the gag law.

The Great War

The "Great War" or "World War" was a break from the traditional wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in one particular aspect. It was the first major post-industrial conflict. This claim is often made for the Civil War and also for the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. The difference is that after 1914, the implications of modern war as concerns the total mobilization of the society were clear to a substantial segment of the population.

The Prussian victory of 1870 was a quick, decisive act which proved their staff, railroad system, and mobilization superior. The Civil War was total; but nineteenth century romanticism affected the society's retrospective view.[1]

After the 1914 Moltke-Schlieffen offensive stalled at the Marne, the trench race to the channel began. Once the trenches were set, the war became a contest of industrial and agricultural capacity. The battle was no longer one of army against army, or mobilization plan against conscription policy. The violence was universalized to include belligerent culture, history, and even philosophy. That is to say, the surviving expressions of official policy and influential analysis reflect this total war attitude. These attitudes were not necessarily shared by even a majority of the population of the United States.[2]

Nevertheless, these attitudes and assumptions formed the major operative policies of the national administration. Initial estimates of men, cannon, shells, ships, and bayonets were irrelevant to what was eventually produced. The army was alledged to be unable even to make estimates. This was considered to be a confession of ineptitude.[3]

Another analysis assumes that the existing military services could not possibly anticipate the degree of participation in the "great war" because they had been given no objective. The peace platform of the presidential

campaign, the reluctance of the administration to initiate preparedness measures, and the traditionally contradictory flow of public opinion in the democratic United States served to confuse rather than guide the war-making departments of the administration.[4]

The immediate result was a policy vacuum. War, of one kind or another, to include merely arming merchant ships or marching on Berlin; had been on the horizon for some time. Ideas and programs to satisfy either end of the contingency continuum were abroad in the societies of preparedness, business, schools, professionals, etc. The policy of the Wilson Administration was to leave them in the civil society. As war approached, a curious division of tasks developed. War or emergency-related issues were dealt with by expanding the federal government and creating new agencies for the new issues. Unlike old wars, when volunteers flowed into the army as militia or state controlled national guardsmen, in 1917 volunteering was suspended in favor of a national draft. Great numbers of private persons converged on Washington to direct the war.[5]

The question facing the Wilson Administration in the early months of 1917 was largely a pragmatic one. The presidential campaign of 1916 had affirmed the personal committment of the President not to enter the war. Unfortunately, the international situation had worsened to the point that there was a real possibility of the Allies losing it. Such a loss, combined with the assumption of

power by the Bolsheviks, could not fail to have political, economic, and social consequences for the United States.[6]

The preparedness campaign had continued to gain strength through the presidential election. Numerous influential voices supported the entry of the United States into the war. This was especially painful for the administration because, to a large degree, the preparedness advocates were, in many cases, the same old Progressives who supported Wilson's domestic program. Should the Allies suddenly collapse in the face of the renewed unrestricted submarine warfare, the Allies might not be able to repay their loans, and the unfolding revolution might well sweep Western Europe in the chaos of military defeat.[7]

Accordingly, although the entire administration strove mightily to remain pacific in thought as well as deed, organizational entities for the prosecution of war were forming. The first of these was the Council of National Defense (CND).[8]

The Military Appropriations Act was introduced in the spring of 1916. The second section of that act empowered the proposed council, composed of the secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, to ensure coordination of industries and resources for the national security and welfare.[9]

More importantly, the act directed that the council nominate and the President appoint an Advisory Commission of seven private individuals with expertise in areas of

labor, industry, public utilities, and natural resources. Congress did not enact the act until June 3, 1916.[10]

There is little doubt thattCongress intended the Advisory Commission as a research and consultative body. Only $200,000 was appropriated for traveling expenses, clerical assistance, and supplies. And yet, by Junej30, 1917, thirty-five committees and subcommittees with duties ranging from alcohol and aluminum to wool and zinc had been formed. The members of the committee were a lexicon of industrial magnates, including H. F. Sinclair and E. L. Doheny, committee on oil; James A. Farrell, President, United States Steel Co.; Thomas F. Manville and J. D. Ryan, President of Anaconda Copper Co. The first director of the council was Walter S. Gifford, formerly chief statistician of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company.[11]

The organization reached full growth March 4, 1918 when the President created the War Industries Board (WIB) out of the Advisory Commission and appointed Bernard Baruch as its first chairman.[12] The history of the WIB is an epic in itself and the subject of much controversy. The attitudes toward organization which the WIB reflected and which were adopted in the early stages of the war are germane.

The Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense was the model upon which all subsequent executive agencies built. It was the first, most comprehensive in representation, and the only organization authorized by legislation.[13]

Early in the game, the Congress realized what was happening. The action organizations were beyond congressional controls. Conversely, the legislatively legitimate agencies represented by Cabinet officers continued to perform generally the same functions they had in peacetime. Under the very real justification of modern, world-wide war, many private citizens carried out many public functions under the most general executive authorization. Not having appeared before Congress for legislative authorization, the "dollar-a-year" men first appeared for accounting when they sought appropriations to continue operations already started.[14]

Faced with an executive fait accompli and a very real war emergency, Congress provided the appropriations, though in lesser amounts than those requested. The executive agencies themselves continued their operations as necessary in pursuit of the efficient prosecution of the war. Congressmen such as Joseph G. Cannon (Republican-Illinois) retained a certain cynicism as to the real political and economic motives of the special boards and commissions. The members of the extraordinary groups railed at the inefficiency and parsimony of Congress.[15] The sole representative of labor at the heady level of the federal government's Cabinet officers and industry's titans on the Advisory Commission was Samuel Gompers. He was an original member of the commission and participated in its first meeting December 6, 1917. In fact, he dictated the

minutes of that meeting.[16] After the declaration of war, Gompers called together 175 representatives of the executive council of the AFL on March 12, 1917. A declaration entitled "American Labor's Position in Peace or in War" was issued the same date. That declaration remained the "charter" for the organized labor position throughout the war, and Gomper's participation in governmental decisions at the highest operational levels lent force to the AFL's position.[17]

When the WIB was established as a separate entity, there was a veteran AFL official as a member. Grosvenor Clarkson, the official historian of the CND and WIB, described his duties. "Strictly speaking, Frayne was not on the Board to represent labor, but to manage it."[18] Besides the powerful relations of the AFL and its subordinate organizations, Gompers could use the ". . . great field forces of the Council of National Defense under which operated the 184,000 units of the state, county, community and municipal councils of defense throughout America, a machinery which transmitted to the people of the country the war measures and needs of the National Administration. . ."[19] The rapid succession of executive agencies broadly covered all aspects of American life. Clarkson, speaking of the WIB, summed up:

> Thus the War Industries Board, already supreme in materials, facilities, finance, and transportation, wheresoever involved in the industrial prosecution of the war, now became the allocator of men, not only between industries, but between civil and military life.

> It was an industrial dictatorship without parallel--a dictatorship by force of necessity and common consent which step by step at last encompassed the Nation and united it into a coordinated and mobile whole, supporting the army and the navy with all the incomparable strength of the greatest industrial potentiality in the world.[20]

The CPI and Labor

One of the most controversial organizations of the many which grew out of the CND was the Committee on Public Information. The committee, headed by "George Creel, Chairman," was created by executive order one week after the declaration of war.[21] The original impetus was for a censorship operation. This was rapidly transmuted into a propaganda operation, both foreign and domestic.[22] As the one central point for the origination of government messages, it was embroiled in controversy from the day of its birth.

The committee was divided into two main sections, Foreign and Domestic. Between the two sections there were more than twenty specialized divisions.[23] Of these, only two could be identified as having duties involving capital and labor. They were the Labor Publications Division and the Industrial Relations Division. The latter only existed under CPI direction in February and March 1918, when it was transferred intact with its director, Roger W. Babson, to the Department of Labor.[24]

By September 1917, the need for direct access to American labor was apparent to George Creel and Samuel Gompers. The Council of America for Democracy and the

Terms of Peace had been formed in New York in that month. This organization was closely allied to the American Socialist movement that had declared its opposition to the war. The council derived largely from a 1914 organization called the Emergency Peace Federation. Some of its more prominent members were Norman Thomas, Scott Nearing, and Morris Hillquit. The organizational shift was a conscious attempt to bring the peace movement more in line with the social objectives of the Socialist worker's movements. By 1917, the principal tactic for stopping the war was one of work stoppages and strikes. Paralyzing the belligerent's industrial capacity would force the fighting to a halt.[25]

To counter this incursion into the working class, the CPI's Labor Publications Division merged with the AFL's American Alliance for Labor and Democracy (AALD). In fact, whatever CPI personnel who were working in the New York-based Labor Publications Division (LPD) were simply transferred on paper to the distribution section. From September 1917 until late 1918, the same names appear on the letterheads of the supposedly separate LPD and AALD.[26]

The head of the LPD/AALD was Robert Maisel, a former member of the AFL's Labor Publicity Organization, and the chief publicist was Chester M. Wright.[27] The CPI paid the salaries, office rent, and certain expenses. These extra expenses were to be a source of concern and worry to George Creel.

In the fall of 1917, the Allied governments were

in a constant frenzy concerning the effects of the Russian Revolution on their own domestic parties of the left. Samuel Gompers established his anti-left-Socialist position by refusing to attend a leftist-dominated labor conference in London. In a spirit of internationalism, the British Labour Party then sent a delegation to tour the United States during late 1917. The AALD assigned two union members to accompany the British and their on-the-road expenses became a heated matter between Creel and Maisel.[28]

Creel began the relation under the impression that he was merely paying the salaries and rent for the union men. In September, he demanded the collection of all the outstanding vouchers of the AALD.[29] This was clearly impossible, since the delegation with the British was still on the road, addressing cheering crowds.[30] Creel nevertheless ordered his business manager, "From now on, nothing is to be paid from this office except salaries and rent." Other expenses were to be paid by Philip Leslie Stokes, AFL treasurer.[31]

The argument as to who was to pay the expenses of the escort continued into March while new issues arose as well. The definition of expenses broadened considerably. "Office" expenses due in March had risen to $1,500. Maisel wrote Clayton D. Lee, CPI business manager and retired business executive who had assumed financial accounting duties from the White House disbursing clerk in October 1917,[32] "I would suggest that you return the bills here

with an advance check, such as was previously done by you, so that bills such as these will not be paid by government check."[33]

On the same date, March 15, Creel was writing to Carl Byoir at his New York address, the Hotel Vanderbilt:

March 15, 1918

Mr. Carl Byoir,
Hotel Vanderbilt,
New York City, N. Y.

My Dear Carl,

I find that Lee has gone to New York, and the enclosed matter calls for instant attention. I feel rather bitterly about this bill; but there seems to be nothing to do but pay it. I want the check, however, to come through the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy. Reach Lee at his home, have Maisel send the check, and tell Lee to make arrangements to refund the money to Maisel as a contribution to the Alliance.

Hastily,

/s/ George Creel

Chairman.[34]

The reason for the urgency is clear. Creel had decided to go before the Appropriations Committee for fiscal 1919 funds. The testimony would be on the record and it would be unwise to have loose vouchers or obligations lying about to cause embarrassment.[35]

Both Maisel and Creel clearly were aware of a source of funds to be used by the AALD and controlled by Creel. That these were not government funds, like those used to pay salaries and rent, is also clear.

A letter dated December 3, 1917 from Cyrus McCormick, President of the International Harvester Company,

with an address about my new privileges then he [illegible]
on duty still made no reply but he left my presence
abruptly."[2]

[illegible] the day came [illegible], Conrad was writing to
Dear Uncle as his new duty entailed, the usual responsibility

Rouen 13, 1911

Mr. Dear Uncle,
Total Confidence,
New York City, Re [illegible]

My Dear Uncle,

I find that are how going to [illegible] and the
business ability which the Institut attempts. I feel
medium ultimately about [illegible] that Rouen seems to
be nothing to [illegible] I what the wrong, how-
ever, to make [illegible] the Academic Ultimate for being
real [illegible]. Under [illegible] sorry Rouen
need the [illegible], and fail [illegible] to make difficulties to
relate the money to Rouen as a qualification in the
Alliance.

Yours,

/s/ George Conrad

Chairman, P

The reason for the warning is clear. Should her
fiancé be an Italian the [illegible] Tradition in
Flood [illegible]. The Tradition would be on the rocks
and it would be unwise to have their business in [illegible]
Stone Light about to [illegible] [illegible].[3]

Both Conrad and Doral clearly have doubts of a lasting
or fruitful [illegible] that [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].
that there were [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] and [illegible], [illegible] [illegible].

A letter [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]. Evaluation of the [illegible] [illegible],

Chicago, provides a clue to the source of the funds.

3 December, 1917.

Cyrus H. McCormick
608 South Michigan Avenue
Chicago

My dear Mr. Creel:

The letter of introduction that I referred to in speaking with you the last time I was in Washington, was your letter of 31 October, introducing Mr. Frank Wolfe, of the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy. Mr. Wolfe, wants to secure One hundred thousand dollars, and my judgment is that if this is a matter in which you are deeply intersted, One thousand dollars should be sufficient from me as a contribution to that fund.

Now referring to the other matter of Thirty thousand dollars, which you asked me to secure for you,- how does that matter rank in importance, in your mind, with this proposal from Mr. Wolfe? I assume that neither of these projects has anything to do with the other. Will you be good enough to tell me if I am correct; that the amount of Thirty thousand dollars is the total sum which you hope to secure, and how soon you wish to have it, and how far you are willing that I should go in asking others to participate in the subscription? I had the thought of mentioning this Thirty thousand dollar matter to Mr. Vanderlip, and Mr. Sisson, of the Guaranty Trust Company of New York. I think he would be willing to help on this.

Whenever you have time to answer me on these subjects, I shall be glad to hear from you.

I am

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ Cyrus H. McCormick

Mr. George Creel,
Committee on Publication,
Washington, D. C. 36

Creel replied immediately.

December 6, 1917.

Mr. Cyrus H. McCormick
606 South Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois.

My dear Mr. McCormick:

The Wolfe matter, relating to the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy, is very close to us, and anything that you can possibly do will be of tremendous assistance. This is our most important body, and I am eager to have it stand on its own feet. If you and your friends in Chicago can help Wolfe, you will not only please me, but others who are above me.

With regard to the other matter of thirty thousand dollars, that was a personal thing that has to do with the maintenance of a corps of highly trained writers here in Washington for special assignment work. If you and a small number of friends could raise this amount, with you to act as trustee in its disbursement, it would be of tremendous help to me and th the service we are trying to do.

Sincerely,

/s/ George Creel
Chairman.[37]

Cyrus McCormick had been an early political supporter of Woodrow Wilson and it is certainly possible that he and Creel were cooperating in enterprises of this sort.[38] It is nevertheless unusual to suggest that wealthy industrialists had established a fund under the control of a government official in order to advance the propagandizing of labor.

The AALD had begun field operations by March 1918. The Chicago-Milwaukee area was a prime target due to the large German population, the past success of the Socialist Party, and the agricultural/industrial importance of the area. Several AALD members moved easily among the largely

volunteer preparedness organizations and defense councils which had sprung up seemingly overnight.

There is considerable correspondence to the CPI under the letterhead of the Wisconsin Loyalty Legion, Milwaukee. One member of their General Council was Winfield R. Gaylord, who was also a second vice president of the AALD at $2,080 a year in June 1918.[39] The legion's "Director of the Bureau of Literature" was Algie M. Simon, a former editor of the Milwaukee Leader, and author. Simon informed the CPI of the demise of a Chicago-based Socialist newspaper, the Appeal to Reason.[40]

Mr. Gaylord's duties were not limited to pamphlet distribution. In early March, Carl Byoir relayed five requests to Creel in memorandum form. Creel refused to authorize "a series of meetings on the East Side (N.Y.)," estimated cost $500.00; $150.00 a week for support of offices in New York, Boston, and Chicago; and a request to send an organizer through New York and Connecticut. Creel approved $1,000 in accrued bills for the central office and a Maisel request "to send Gaylord at $40.00 a week and expenses through the middle west." The chairman added in his own handwriting, "Gaylord--Chicago and Wisconsin Before election /Creel's emphasis/."[41] Gaylord reported a large demonstration in April and was promoted to second vice president in June.[42]

The kind of literature being distributed is typified by two AALD pamphlets written by Professor of Political

Economy, John R. Commons, of the University of Wisconsin. The first, published about February 1918, was titled, "Why Workingmen Support the War."[43] A few quotes from the eight-page booklet will show why it could not appear under government authorship:

> . . . American labor will come out of this war with the universal eight-hour day and with as much power to fix its own wages by its own representatives as employers have. (p.3)
>
> Capitalists are being controlled . . . by leaders whom the workingmen themselves put on various war boards. (p. 3)
>
> All through these industries President Wilson is enforcing, as fast as the boards can get to it, the eight-hour day, as well as time and one-half pay for overtime work. (p. 4)
>
> All labor in this country is benefiting because organized labor is actually "on the inside in running the Government." (p. 4)
>
> Wage earners democracy is coming . . . (p. 5)[44]

An example of legislative action taken at the state level was the "Wisconsin Emergency Labor Employment Act" in late 1917. Professor Commons drafted the act in cooperation with the AALD. The act provided for the use of the University of Wisconsin Extension agents in the coordination of labor resources.[45] This attempt to duplicate the Department of Agriculture's successful procedure is a constant throughout all governmental approaches to the labor problem throughout the war. The organizational assumptions were to build upon the successful experience of the Department of Agriculture. The consensus adhering to the desirability of the distribution of employment information

would be the departure point for establishment of government employment offices. As Professor Commons wrote in another AALD pamphlet, "Who is Paying for This War?":

> Our Government is building up a great system of employment offices which Germany and England had before the war started. This will do away with an immense amount of lost time by workmen in hunting jobs. (p. 8)[46]

The CPI and the Appropriations Committee

George Creel made rather a point of his facing his congressional critics in Rebel at Large and How We Advertised America. Other evidence suggests he was less than enthusiastic about the prospect. He appeared in mid-June 1918, well-prepared, and armed with a considerable amount of material to justify appropriated support. There was never a second appearance, as Congress refused to continue support in 1919. The CND was the reluctant liquidating agency and their report touched off the controversy which resulted in a 1920 Senate investigation.[47]

The redoubtable chairman appeared before the Congress as much in response to their criticism as otherwise. Congressman Gillett of Massachusetts, soon to become the Speaker of the House in May 1919, and one prime mover behind the law prohibiting the hiring of publicity experts,[48] mounted one attack on the constitutionality of the CPI in December 1917. These attacks continued before the Appropriations Committee. There were nine attacks in March, eighteen in April, thirteen in May (decision made to appear end of May), six in June and only three in July. One might

say the CPI was rhetorically dragged before Congress.[49]

The sympathetic overview of Mock and Larson remains the best general reference on the Committee's organization.[50] They identified twenty-one domestic divisions and four foreign divisions (they did not specify those divisions dealing with specific foreign countries).

George Creel testified on fifteen domestic divisions, the organization of which does not conform to any other report. The only division with a remote similarity to the AALD/LPD is an "Industrial Division." The only testimony mentioning the "Division of Labor Publications, Emigrant Bldg., New York . . . $1,600." appears in a list of rental estimates for seventeen CPI offices. The AALD appears only twice, under testimony for the non-existent I Industrial Division's advisory commission where it is allotted one member of six--the others being representatives of the AFL, Department of Labor, the CPI, the war-making departments, and the manufacturing.[51] The lengthy list of publications distributed includes 825,000 pamphlets for the AALD. The Commons pamphlets, "Who is Paying for This War" and "Why Workingmen Support the War," are listed as "recent issues the distribution of which has just begun."[52] Both pamphlets carry the imprint of the AALD, not the CPI.

There is little doubt the CPI men were not entirely candid. However, only in the report of personnel and salaries did they actually mislead the committee. Creel's

testimony did not explicitly claim his lists of employees to be comprehensive of all activities, and public questioning did not force him to be entirely explicit on all matters. As Creel testified, the Labor Publications Division was listed as a subordinate part of the New York Division of Distribution office under Henry Atwater. The personnel listing of that division lists Mr. Simon of Milwaukee at $12 a year. It does not list Gaylord, Maisel, or Wright. And yet they were on the payroll for the not inconsequential sums of $2,080, $2,600, and $2,600, respectively.[53] As a division of the CPI, the Labor Publications Division was included under the New York distribution office--which justified salaries and office rental.[54] The substantive function of a domestic propaganda activity operating among employers and employees was accounted for in very general terms in testimony concerning the Industrial Division.[55] This exchange degenerated into a rather confusing debate over functional definitions and will be covered in Chapter II.

The CPI received an appropriation of $1,250,000 vice the $2,098,000 requested.[56] Congress did not address the issue of the AALD/LPD, either choosing to ignore it or simply ignorant of the scope of the operation among labor.

The work of the AALD continued. A convention was held in St. Paul, Minnesota in June and Carl Byoir and Henry Atwater allegedly wrote the resolutions to be presented.[57] Mock and Larson state that CPI support of the AALD

ceased after the congressional hearings. This is doubtful, becuase the officers continued to make very specific reports of activities and attendant costs. Chester Wright complained (July 31, 1918) that the new mailing regulations meant an increased cost of $400 annually to the AALD. Creel directed him to use Atwater's government frank at the CPI New York office.[58]

Maisel wrote a glowing letter to Byoir and Creel shortly after Labor Day. He reported that there were Alliance sponsored celebrations in 600 American cities. Alliance speakers delivered 122 Labor Day addresses--at a cost of $796.55. With traveling expenses added, the cost to the CPI would be $1,096.95. The AALD address in San Antonio was delivered by W. A. Turner; in San Francisco, W. B. Rubin addressed the Labor Council and the Building Trades Council, " . . . A feature of the procession was a float designed as a replica of the steamer Invincible at a cost of $1,000. The float was presented to the Iron Trades Council by J. J. Tynan, Vice President and General Manager of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation."[59]

The money being spent was not inconsiderable. When Samuel Gompers returned from the Inter-Allied Labor Conference (November 9, 1918), the AALD sponsored a great reception in Chicago. Samuel Insull, Chairman of the Illinois Council of National Defense, was a co-host and the guest list included twelve governors. Maisel began preparing early. On the letterhead of the LPD, he asked Byoir to

"please advance $500.00. It is estimated the event will cost $3,000-$4,000."[60]

The final report is interesting because it returns the issue to the CND, the parent of all the special boards and agencies. Taro Katagiri has described this confusing procedure from the end of 1918 to Senator Smoot's Joint Committee on Printing Report of April 1920.[61] The last session of the 65th Congress had maddated the end of the CPI by June 30 on March 1, 1919. Creel himself resigned effective March 15. The CND report was not finally complete until June 9, 1920.[62] The CND had accepted the task, reluctantly, in September 1919.[63] What is of primary interest here is the fact that the final report of the CND stated that no records of three divisions could be located: Pictorial Publicity, Industrial Relations, and Labor Publicity.[64]

George Creel's popularized final report, How We Advertised America, makes no mention of wither the LPD or the AALD except in the appendix, where the titles and numbers of the AALD pamphlets are listed. He did make a statement to the CND liquidating officer, E. K. Ellsworth, that " . . . the files and records of the Labor Publications Division were incorporated with the files and records of the Division of Civic and Educational Cooperation" (Professor Guy S. Ford's historians).[65] Unfortunately, the business records, vouchers, receipts, etc. have been progressively destroyed by the Archives during periodic purifications.

Professor Ford's records still comprise some thirty-odd drawers, none of which bear directly on the LPD/AMLD. Conversely, the latter files are contained in a single drawer.

Transition to Domestic Problems

Once the decision for war had been made, an organizational imperative was created which drew together the Democratic Party, organized labor, the federal bureaucracy, and the old Progressives of 1912. The fantastic success of this coalition in fueling the war machine created attitudes which were not restricted to the war emergency. If such a combination could bring such domestic benefits, why not project it past the war?

The CPI, by making universalist assumptions concerning the role of the United States in the Great War, was drawn into domestic propaganda activities far outside existing laws and constitutional procedure. These activities led to jurisdictional disputes within the executive branch as well as conflict with the Congress.

The centralization of authority represented by the early activities of the CND provided an organizational model which was imitated by other wartime agencies such as the CPI. Though this situation was perhaps necessary to the prosecution of the war in the early months, the unchecked power created opportunities for the abuse of executive prerogatives.

Believing themselves effective toward the end of the

successful prosecution of the war, the officers of the CPI progressively adopted questionable means of operation. The Congress appropriated $1,250,000 to the committee in 1918, and that is precisely the final amount Creel reported for salaries. That such a balance should result seems rather more than coincidental. Creel and Byoir were very evasive before the Appropriations Committee; but then it is doubtful the representatives desired them to be too explicit. The disappearance of key records is most often attributed to inefficiency. In combination, however, it can be safely assumed that Congress suspected the worst of George Creel and the CPI.

George Creel's committee never had a real chance of perpetuating itself past the 1918 Armistice. However, some of the functions, sections, and divisions entertained such hopes. One of these was Roger W. Babson's Industrial Relations Division which had only remained under the CPI aegis during the months of February and March 1918 before it was transferred to the Department of Labor. Once there, it was renamed Inquiry and Education, Information and Education, and Manufacturer's Information. The name changed, but the function did not. The issue remained the industrial manpower of America--how to organize, inform, and use it.

CHAPTER I FOOTNOTES

[1]Hajo Holborn, "Moltke and Schlieffen: The Prussian-German School," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. by Edward M. Earle (New York: Athencum, 1970), p. 176, 189, 194.

[2]Ibid.; Walter Millis, Arms and Men (New York: Mentor, 1956), p. 157.

[3]Grosrenor B. Clarkson, Industrial America in the World War (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1923), p. 31.

[4]Margaret L. Coit, Mr. Baruch (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), p. 154.

[5]Coit, p. 199; Millis, pp. 208-211.

[6]Arno J. Mayer, Wilson vs. Lenin (New York: Meridian, 1964), p. 371.

[7]Clarkson, Appendix I.

[8]Ibid.; Millis, 202.

[9]Millis, p. 202.

[10]Ibid.; Clarkson, Appendix I, sec. 2. The funds were appropriated in the Army Appropriation Act, Aug. 29, 1916.

[11]Clarkson, p. 17.

[12]Ibid., Appendix II. The Overman Act authorized a sweeping reorganization and consolidation of government agencies.

[13]Ibid.

[14]U.S. Congress, House, Hearings, Sundry Civil Bill, 1919 before the House Appropriations Committee, 65th Cong., 2nd sess, June 11-13, 1918 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1918). (Hereafter Hearings Sundry 1919.)

[15]Walter Lippmann, Drift and Mastery (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1961), p. 7.

[16]Coit, p. 155.

[17]Frank L. Grubbs, "Council and Labor Propaganda: 1917-1919," Labor History, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring, 1966), 155.

[18]Clarkson, p. 276.

[19]Ibid., p. viii.

[20]Ibid., p. 292.

[21]Hearings, Sundry 1919. Executive Order 2495 reproduced.

[22]James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, Words That Won The War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), p. 65

[23]Ibid.

[24]Ibid., p. 70.

[25]Grubbs, p. 158.

[26]U.S. Government, National Archives, Committee of Public Information, Files and Manuscript, Series CPI 11-A6, Box 1. (Hereafter CPI Mss. AALD.)

[27]Maisel did not achieve the prominence Wright did. The latter accompanied Gompers on his European mission in 1917, became the assistant editor of the American Federationist in 1922, Director AFL Information and Publicity 1920-1922. Reference, The American Labor Who's Who (New York: Hanford Press, 1925), pp. 255-256.

[28]Letter, Maisel to Creel, Mar. 1, 1918, CPI Mss. AALD.

[29]Memo, Creel to Claffey, Sept. 21, 1917, CPI Mss. AALD.

[30]Letter, Maisel to Creel, Mar. 1, 1918, CPI Mss. AALD.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Mock and Larson, p. 67.

[33]Letter, Maisel to C. D. Lee, Mar. 15, 1918, CPI Mss. AALD.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Josephus Daniels dates the decision early May. However, the implications of the Overman Act of early March were that future funding of the war emergency executive agencies would require legislative approval.

[36]CPI Mss. AALD.

[37]Ibid.

[38]Josephus Daniels mentions a 1917 antitrust suit against International Harvester. McCormick was appointed a special member of the Russian-Soviet Mission by Wilson. Lastly, there is a large file of letters in the CPI Mss. from International Harvester distributors to George Creel. Each begins "The writer understands that you desire to be advised . . . ."

[39]Letterhead dated June 3, 1918; Memo, Creel to Lee, July 11, 1918, CPI Mss. AALD.

[40]Who's Who in America, 1920-1921. A University of Wisconsin graduate of 1895, Simon worked for the Worker's Call (1900), International Socialist Review (1900-1906), Chicago Daily Socialist (1906-1910). He left the Leader in 1916.

[41]Memo, Byoir to Creel, Mar. 6, 1918, CPI Mss. AALD.

[42]Letter, Gaylord to Creel, June 3, 1918, CPI Mss. AALD.

[43]John R. Commons, "Why Workingmen Support the War," pamphlet (51 Chambers St., New York: AALD), CPI Mss. AALD.

[44]Ibid. An examination of the Commons Mss. at the WSHS shows no evidence of any of the pamphlets.

[45]Proclamation of State Council of Defense, May 10, 1917 (Act of Legislature, Chap. 82, Laws of 1917), CPI Mss. Series 3-A1, Box 2.

[46]Ibid., Box 6.

[47]U.S. Government, Federal Records Center, Files and Proceedings, Council of National Defense, Director's Office, Letter N. D. Baker to G. Clarkson, Sept. 19, 1919, Series 2 A6, Box 84. (Hereafter CND Mss.) Also, see Senate Doc. 144, 66th Cong., 1st sess.

[48]5 U.S.C. 3107 (1970).

[49]Taro Katagiri, "Congressional Attitudes Toward the Committee on Public Information" unpublished M.A. thesis, Univeristy of Wisconsin (1964), p. 282-283

[50]Mock and Larson, p. 65 ff.

[51]Hearings, Sundry 1919, p. 120.

57 1914.

58 Townsend Harris' article a 1917 editorial suit against International Harvester. McCormick was deposited a special member of the Executive Committee by Wilson. Lastly, there is a large file of letters to the CPI Bur. from International Harvester directors on Taussig Council. Each begins "The writer understands that you desire to be advised . . . ."

59 Lackawanna Steel Corp. to J. Reid Comm. Chmn. re Ins. Mtg. 11, 1918, CPI Mss. AAC>.

60 Who's Who in America, 1930-1931, A Quinquennial Biocosmic Publicity of 1899, Since merged for the Worker's call (1924), International Socialist Review (1901-1902). Political Party Platforms (1896-1919). The Year the Worker is 1919.

61 Memo, Davis to Creel, Mar. 6, 1918, CPI Mss. AAC>.

62 Letter, Creel to Creel, June 1, 1918, CPI Mss. AAC>.

63 Duke v. Commons, "The Revolutionary Imperative Ins. Mtg." pamphlet (St Columbus Co., New York: 1918), CPI Mss. AAC>.

64 1914, An examination of the Commons Mss. of the ways about To evidence of any of the pamphlets.

65 Proclamation of 1914- Council of Defense, May 10, 1917 (Act of Legislature, Chap. 83, Laws of 1917), CPI Mss. Series 3-A3, Box 1.

66 1914., Box 8.

67 U.S. Government, Federal Records Center, Files and Procedures, Council of National Defense, Director's Office, Letter V. O. Eaker to C. Clinton, Sept. 12, 1919, Series 3, 14, Pos 84. (Correspondence Mss Mss.) Also, see Series Mss. 144, Gen Corp., Int Comm.

68 S.C.C. Supt (1974).

69 Pete Interpol. "Commencement Activities Theory Co Committee on Public Relations" Organizations N.A. Thesis, University of Wisconsin (1924), p. 184-185.

70 Mass and Lurens, p. 42 ff.

71 Hastings, Boulder 1970, p. 110.

[52]Ibid.

[53]Letter Maisel to Lee, July 11, 1918, CPI Mss. AALD.

[54]Hearings, Sundry 1919, p. 120.

[55]Ibid., p. 19, 54, 122.

[56]CND Report, CPI Mss., Series CPI 1-C7 (June 9, 1920) p. 7.

[57]Mock and Larson, pp. 206-209.

[58]AALD report, April 30, 1918; Maisel to Byoir, Sept. 28, 1918; Wright to Byoir, July 31, 1918, CPI Mss. AALD.

[59]Letter, Maisel to Creel and Byoir, Oct. 5, 1918, CPI Mss. AALD.

[60]Letter, Maisel to Byoir, Sept. 28, 1918, CPI Mss. AALD.

[61]Katagiri, pp. 219-229.

[62]CND Report, CPI Mss., Series CPI 1-C7 (June 9, 1920).

[63]Letter, Clarkson to Congressman James W. Good, Chairman House Appropriations Committee, Feb. 11, 1920, CND Mss.

CHAPTER II

EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS, 1919

Promoting a Federal Role

The passage of the gag law in its simplest interpretation provided for penalties against federal officers using backfire tactics on Congress. The quick fiscal strangulation of the Committee on Public Information indicates that it was not a congressional target with imposing friends or supporters. When the law was first proposed in the House (February 28, 1919), action had already been initiated to cease all funding of the CPI.[1] George Creel was highly indignant that the profits from his committee's activities had been recovered into the Treasury and he had been refused an appropriation to cover the final accounting.[2]

Self-promotion of George Creel and subsequent revisionists to the contrary, there was never a chance that the CPI would be continued in any form.[3] Once the "war emergency" was ended, the justification for the primary source of funds--the President's security fund--was ended. Only legislatively approved and appropriation-supported activities had hope of continuation.

As early as May 1919, the Department of Labor sought support for two new, war-related activities. They were the United States Employment Service (USES) under John B.

Densmore and the Information and Education Service under Roger W. Babson. In the latter case, Babson was appearing before the committee in order to secure an appropriation for a new and ambitious program of employer-employee relations. Since his movement to the Department of Labor in March 1918, he had operated as the head of the "Manufacturers Information Division" under the USES.[4] He had a staff of eight, including a man in charge of "employment courses," and was paid a rather modest $2,500.

The Labor Department hierarchy supported the new information service.[5] However, their enthusiasm abated under the hostility of the committee and on May 31, 1918, Babson faced the committee alone.[6] He requested a compiling division (surplus/shortage of labor throughout the United States), a general inquiry division, and an education division, all at a cost of $283,000. However, as the testimony developed, it became clear Babson had a further project in mind. Claiming he could save the government 500 million to one billion dollars a year, he stated, "Labor has got to be mobilized in some way or another: labor has got to be mobilized systematically."[7]

Systematic mobilization meant, firstly, a "definite campaign of mobilization," and secondly a government-maintained "honor record" on each of two million industrial workers (those "who have direct contracts" with the government).[8] This amounted to an efficiency rating for each individual worker in war work and would be available

after the war. Babson went on to say if this were not done we would be defeated or labor conscription would be required.

The questioning turned to the practicality of the matter and the congressmen's patience wore thin. Chairman Swagar Sherley (Democrat-Virginia) said:

> We have never been able to develop a sufficiently intelligent central Government force to do it /organize work efficiently/ for the Government in its own work . . . we have never yet developed the intelligence and capacity inside the Government for running the Government's own business, let alone running everybody else's.[9]

The testimony ended shortly after Mr. Babson allowed that it would cost about five million dollars to carry out his program. He did not get his appropriation; but he did get his program in reduced form within the Department of Labor.[10] The comprehensive information system was implemented in the hinterlands by the apparatus of the USES.[11] In his sympathetic, 1919 biography of William B. Wilson, Babson states the Information and Education Service was organized July 1, 1918 (after his committee appearance). He does not refer to the hearings and returns to the original Department of Labor legislation as the statuatory authority for this service.[12]

The question of control of the information programs of the Department of Labor had occurred the previous year, 1917. Even the modest plans at that time had raised the issue of lobbying by government officials.

Hearings on "Urgent Appropriations on Account of War Expenses, 1918" commended immediately upon the beginning of the 1918 fiscal year, July 1917. Most agencies were seeking essentially modest increases in clerical staffs, office machinery and administrative assistance.

The Department of Labor appeared before the committee in the persons of Secretary of Labor W. B. Wilson, Chief Clerk Robert Watson, and Deputy Commissioner of Labor Statistics Royal Meeker. The secretary requested authority to move the officers, clerks, and employees of the Division of Information, Bureau of Immigration to the newly designated USES under the Department of Labor in Washington, D. C.[13] The secretary's rationale stipulated that since immigration had decreased upon the outbreak of war, there was less need to provide information at the ports of entry. Also, the rapid expansion of war-related industry required an improved system of internal communication within the country. Mechanics, steel-fitters, shipyard workers, electricians, etc. needed to be shifted and informed of industry's needs to increase war production efficiency.

The committee chairman, Congressman J. J. Fitzgerald, a Tammany Democrat of New York (and a superb parliamentarian according to "Champ" Clark), inquired whether this would "in effect create a national employment service.? Mr. Wilson replied in the affirmative and stated he would have twenty-one directors in the field.[14]

Questioning by the Appropriations Committee

eventually turned to Raymond Crist, of the Bureau of Naturalization. The bureau had requested $150,000 for travel expenses of examiners. Crist said that there was great demand from all over the United States for the assistance of these examiners in the teaching of candidates for naturalization. The committee chairman challenged this assertion and stated that the seemingly spontaneous grass-roots demand was in fact stimulated by the federal bureau. He introduced a Bureau of Naturalization form letter to chief examiners dated April 1917 into the record. The second paragraph began

> In order to secure this money [the $150,000 travel expenses] it will be necessary for you and your examiners in a judicious and discreet way to prevail in person and not by letter on local influences, such as superintendents of schools, judges of courts, clerks of courts, and others, and have them write or telegraph their Representatives and Senators in Congress to appear before the Members of the Appropriations Committee of the Senate and House. . . [15]

Chairman Fitzgerald demanded the list of local officers so influenced, and roundly condemned the practice:

> No: this estimate was submitted to Congress in April, and immediately upon its submission the chief of your bureau sent that letter to every examiner in the field starting them to interviewing and appealing to the judges and other persons that they though might have some influence with Members of Congress to pester them with letters and telegrams about the inadequate appropriations made for this, without any information on their part whatever; an attempt to create a furor here because something had been neglected in connection with the service . . . [16]

The United States Employment Service and Politics

The need for some form of public employment service was first recognized by the nation's cities. New York City had begun the first service in 1834 and San Francisco founded offices in 1868. In 1890, prodded by the Municipal Labor Congress of Cincinnati, five Ohio cities founded offices. In 1893, far west cities such as Seattle, Spokane, and Takoma responded to growing local pressure [17] and established municipal offices.

In 1907 the Bureau of Immigration, then under the Department of the Interior, founded a Division of Information "to meet the problem of oversupply of immigrants in port cities." Congress refused funds for field offices in several cities and the only one authorized was that at Ellis Island.[18]

Shortly after the inauguration of the Wilson Administration in 1913, the bureaus of immigration and labor were transferred from the old Department of Commerce and Labor to form the nucleus of the new Department of Labor. Congress was reluctant to advance funds for a national employment service or indeed for any nation-wide functional agency to deal with labor problems. The department eluded this restriction by establishing employment zones under the immigration inspectors in the various states. Washington (14), California (14), and Texas (10) received the highest number of offices.[19]

The total appropriation granted the Department of

Labor by Congress for the 1918 fiscal year was one-third what was requested. In the absence of appropriated funds and specific legislative authority, the department went ahead and issued directives for the creation of a USES on January 3, 1918. To finance the operation, the President provided $825,000 from his national defense and security fund.[20] Their position was that legislative authorization existed in the language of the department's original, 1913 charter, "to foster, promote and develop the welfare of wage earners, to improve their working conditions, and to advance their opportunities for profitable employment.[21]

There the legislative issue remained for the remainder of the war. The war emergency powers of the executive, the centralization of power in the hands of the various departments and boards, and the military necessities provided the momentum which swept the nation along. With the Armistice and the congressional elections in November 1918, conditions changed quickly. Any previous consensus was quickly forgotten as politics resumed with a vengeance. Congress moved to cut off appropriations and information functions simultaneously.

The USES appropriation for the fiscal year 1919 was carried in the Sundry Civil Bill which was still before the House during February 1919. Monies for the past activities (that is, fiscal 1918) of the USES were in the Third Deficiency Appropriation Act also before Congress in February. The CPI and USES appropriations were sharply

reduced or eliminated in the Sundry Civil Bill. A rider requiring all government duplicating to be done at the Government Printing Office was attached to the same bill.[22] The Sundry Bill was signed into law March 1, 1919. The gag rider was attached to the Deficiency Bill. That bill was passed by the House of February 28, 1919; however, it was filibustered and died in the Senate March 4, 1919. The Deficiency Bill was reintroduced after the convening of the special session in May and passed with the gag rider attached.[23]

The administration did not shrink from the struggle with Congress. In late February, the President called for a conference of governors and mayors in Washington, D. C., March 3-4. Although the League of Nations and the Versailles Treaty were the most newsworthy issues, the domestic front was not forgotten. The Washington Post reported:

> The intimation is given that he [President Wilson] has some ideas for cooperation between Federal and State and municipal government looking to give employment to idle men. Doughboys returned to find jobs held by women and flat feet men. There are 350,000 out of work.[24]

It was an angry group of governors and mayors who assembled in the capitol. They condemned Congress for failing to pass the appropriation bills and the executive for failing to provide policy leadership. Colorful Mayor Rolph of San Francisco charged that the government had failed to provide leadership. "Congress has adjourned, the President has gone to Paris, and the vice president to Phoenix. Everybody has flown the coop except the mayors.[25]

Secretary of Labor Willism B. Wilson had not adjourned. He addressed the conference and raised a spectre which would be used repeatedly in the future. The destructive strikes in Seattle, Washington; Butte, Montana; and Lawrence, Massachusetts, were neither economic nor industrial in origin. They were political attempts to set up soviets in the United States.[26] The Seattle general strike was much in the headlines. It brought Mayor Ole Hanson to national prominence and served to complicate the labor situation without clarifying very much.[27]

The AFL, which represented almost all the organized unions in the United States, had strenuously avoided association with the radical Socialists and the IWW. In the East and Midwest, this program was not exceptionally difficult. However, in the far West, the radical strain ran much deeper. Many of the laboring men were in fact Americans of several generations. Their westering had been motivated by a native American radicalism. Accordingly, the strength of the IWW was located in the West.[28]

As the war began, the shipyards of Portland, Seattle, and Tacoma were expanded considerably. The construction of shipping came under the firect control of the government's Emergency Shipping Corporation. Production accelerated sharply and with it a demand for skilled labor. In Seattle, that skilled labor formed closed shops.[29] A Central Labor Council was established to represent all the craft unions of the area. The Washington State Federation of Labor published

its own weekly newspaper, the Seattle Union Record. The paper was edited by E. B. Ault and its offices were located in the Seattle Labor Temple.[30]

The Central Labor Council struck a more militant line than the AFL throughout the war. Labor was in an advantageous position because of the continuing demand for the skilled craftsmen needed in the yards. In most cases, disputes were resolved through the federal mediation machinery of the War Labor Board. During the war, the council accepted federal mediation without conceding the decisions of the board to be binding upon them. The issue came to a head on January 31, 1919 when the council, rejecting the adjudication of the War Labor Board, called a general strike.[31] The Secretary of Labor characterized the strike as an attempt to set up soviets in the United States. Mayor Ole Hanson was described in heroic terms for his resistance to Bolshevism.[32] The offending evidence cited by other newspapers and the government was an editorial from the Union Record of February 3, 1919. The editorial stated the objectives of the strike were political and led down a "road that leads No One Knows Where."[33]

Congress insisted that the USES was deeply involved with the union movement in Seattle. In 1918, reports had been published that Midwest offices of the Employment Service were refusing to accept applicants for Seattle jobs unless they could show proof of union membership.[34] The Department of Labor admitted that this was in fact the

practice. W. B. Wilson contended it would be unrealistic and cruel to enlist non-union labor who would arrive on the West Coast and then be forced to join unions.

The Union Record provided a good press for the USES. During February and March, when the regular appropriation was before the Congress, there ware eight stories favoring the service. The articles and stories ranged from straight news concerning the Congressional action to attacks on congressmen and senators for their opposition. The Union Record made clear that they favored a federal system of labor exchanges, feared civil disorder if unemployment was not checked, and damned Congress for failing to act on the fourteen million dollar proposal for a permanent service. "Senators and Representatives should be notified officially by unions to continue U.S.E.S. . . . Workers, write!"[35]

Perhaps the most revealing article appeared February 20 as "Gossip from Washington" by "Anise." The article contained an interview with a USES official, F. A. Silcox. After a discussion condemning the private labor exchanges and unsatisfactory approaches to unemployment, the interviewer challenged Mr. Silcox in a friendly way. "It's getting harder and harder, isn't it, for the government to stay on the fence between capital and Labor?" Mr. Silcox replied, "Strictly speaking," he smiled, "it can't be done."[36]

Grosvenor Clarkson, Director of the Council of National Defense, retained notes of the Governors and Mayors

Conference. The CND staff was still in existence in March 1919 and striving to appear neutral in the struggle between the Congress and the executive. The CND was coordinating voluntary employment placement through the remaining local councils of defense. Clarkson claimed to have organized 1,850 such voluntary organizations in a letter to the Appropriations Committee Chairman, Swagar Sherley February 5, 1919.[37] He noted the remarks of Seattle representative Willism Piggott's address: "Forget yourselves and politics. The evil of our whole situation in this country has been the desire of men to hold public office."[38]

The March conference failed to accomplish anything except a bad press for the administration. Accordingly, the Secretary of Labor called another, to the specific point of the employment service. The conference was held April 23-25, 1919, "to discuss the subject of a National Employment Service in cooperation with states and municipalities, and to project a program for legislation."[39] There were sixty-eight attendees from the various state employment agencies, including ten representatives of the federal office in Washington, D. C.[40] A draft bill (to become H.R. 4305) was produced. Congressman John I. Nolan (Democrat-California) introduced the bill and hearings were scheduled before a Joint Senate-House Committee June 19, 1919.[41]

Coincidentally, the AFL's annual convention was scheduled to begin in Atlantic City, New Jersey on June 10.

Samuel Gompers delivered the keynote speech and raised the issue of Socialist-Communist-IWW radicalism affecting the jobless and the demobilized soldiers. A drum beat of publicity was maintained in the magazine press.

It would be consistent to assume that if the USES was in fact agitating for political support among civic and labor organizations, there would be evidence of this activity in the press. Walter Lippmann's treatment of "The Nature of News" is relevant. Speaking on the subject of very complex events, he said in 1921:

> . . . the news on these subjects is bound to be debatable, when it is not wholly neglected. . . . They do not take shape until somebody investigates, or somebody publicly, in the etymological meaning of the word, makes an issue of them.
>
> This is the underlying reason for the existence of the press agent.[42]

The New Republic did not take a strong position on the specific issue of the USES. In an article by Arthur MacMahon, "The Crisis of Demobilization," the prospect of cancellation of the government's service to returning soldiers was viewed in terms of a potential for civil disorder. He concluded that the nation "cannot afford to leave a single expedient untried."[43]

The Survey, "an experiment in cooperative journalism," published several accounts of the troubles of the USES. The magazine was a cooperative weekly venture drawing upon a wide range of correspondents from Jane Addams to Albert Lasker. Edited by veteran progressive Paul U. Kellogg, the February 8 issue published an article titled, "The Attack Upon the Federal Employment System" by Edward T. Devine.[44]

the article justified the service's function under the departmental charter of promoting and fostering the welfare of workers. The lineage of the USES was traced to the Labor Policies Board and its chairman Felix Frankfurter. In April, Devine followed with "The F.E.S. Analysis and Forecast." He reported the troubles of the service and concluded that the Washington staff was indeed too large and inefficient.[45]

One magazine with a radically different point of view was Life and Labor, edited by Mrs. Raymond Robins, wife of the controversial Red Cross official. A Chicago publication of the National Women's Trade Union League of America, the magazine owed more to Jane Addams and Hull House movement than it did to the AFL.[46] The April issue carried four stories concerning the USES. The last story commented:

> Due to the failure of the last Congress to pass the urgent deficiency appropriations bill, the Federal employment service bureaus have been compelled to cut down their forces 80 per cent. This reduction went into effect March 22. The order limiting the employment service of the government urged all labor organizations, state and municipal authorities, welfare organizations and chambers of commerce to continue to work as far as possible.[47]

One magazine with a special public was The Federal Employee, published monthly by the National Federation of Federal Employees since August 24, 1916. One story, "The United States Employment Service, A General Overview" appeared in January. The author was a member of the CND,

D. M. Reynolds. Major stories appeared in the June issue, one by Assistant Secretary of Labor Louis F. Post, and one by the Director General of the USES, J. B. Densmore, Who said, "A nation-wide employment system is a more important right of the citizens of a democratic country than are adequate systems of roads, schools, railways and other utilities."[48]

The Federal Employee did not print any coverage of the gag amendment. Instead, it concentrated coverage on the positive need of the USES and it attacked the employment service's main enemy, Congressman Thomas Blanton of Texas.[49] His role in the controversy will be covered later.

The business point of view was well represented by Industry. The magazine was a semi-monthly edited by Henry Harrison Lewis and published in Washington, D. C. It styled itself as an interpreter of industrial progress. Industry came to life on December 1, 1918 and immediately began attacking the employment service. The issue of January 1, 1919 chronicled the history of the Department of Labor and accused the USES of being a "promoter of Unionism."[50] The story detailed pro-union activities of examiners in Muskegon, Michigan. On January 15, the magazine accused the Director General of the USES, Densmore, with interfering with the processes of justice in the San Francisco District Attorney's office. "Interference by the Federal Government" implicated the leadership of the Department of Labor in a phone-bugging scheme.[51] On February 15, the magazine

charged the department with illegal lobbying. On March 1, the page one lead story associated the USES with labor propaganda and said the entire unemployment problem could not be understood because of that propaganda.

> Some action should be taken by Congress to prevent placeholders using public funds for perpetuation of their jobs. The news are filled with statements l . . someone paid for the thousands of telegrams which deluged Congress. The Post Office Department paid for carrying franked letters for the same purpose. The taxpayer, in the ultimate analysis pays. . . . [52]

This story appeared in the March 1 issue and Representative Good had offered his amendment February 28.

The new 66th Congress convened on May 19. On June 1, the lead story of Industry printed a resolution of the National Industrial Conference Board (representing 20,000 manufacturing corporations) denouncing the USES as "incompetent, extravagant and inefficient."[53] The second story printed the gag rider verbatim and stated the amendment had come from the Appropriations Committee on May 28. It had, in fact, been originally proposed and passed on the floor of the 65th Congress February 28.[54] Further, it was offered on the floor for the second time May 28, not in committee. In the same issue, there was a story citing the opposition of the National Association of Employment Managers and the Southern Metal Trades Association.[55]

The magazine then shifted its attention to the hearings of the Joint Committee on Labor for the Kenyon-Nolan Bill. This bill proposed legislative authority for a permanent, national employment service. Stories attacking

the bill appeared June 15 (two), July 1 (two), July 15 (three), August 1 (two), and August 15.

Hearings on the Kenyon-Nolan Bill considered two Senate bills and the above mentioned House bill. The USES had been eliminated as a duly authorized agency for fiscal 1919 when it was eliminated from the Sundry Bill in March. It still had a hope of survival in the Third Deficiency Bill pending in Congress or through passage of any of the bills before the Joint Labor Committee.

Two bizarre incidents developed which raised fears of unchecked and irresponsible federal government interference in local affairs. Both cases were used against the USES and its officers.

The Blanton case involved USES-prepared editorials placed in Texas newspapers. The articles were used to highlight Blanton's opposition to the government's employment policies. Department of Labor funds were used for the traveling expenses of USES operatives in Blanton's Texas district. Lastly, Blanton presented evidence that the USES was promoting the AFL-affiliated Federal Employees Union among all government workers.[56]

Congressman Blanton of Texas was an implacable foe of the USES. He was not a member of the Appropriations Committee and his attacks upon the service occurred on the floor of the House and before the Joint Labor Committe. Immediately following Congressman Good's proposed gag amendment on February 28, he announced his support and

showed telegrams he had received from labor unions.[57] In May, after the special session had convened, he temporarily killed even the meagre $272,000 deficiency appropriation for the service by subjecting it to a point of order as new legislation.[58]

Under the Rules of the House, an issue carried in an appropriation which is construed to be "new legislation" can be returned to committee by a single member's raising a "point of order" and being upheld by the Speaker.[59] Blanton succeeded in delaying the USES appropriation in this manner. The same maneuver could have been used against Congressman Good's gag rider, which he admitted was subject to a point of order; however, no one raised an objection. This implies that the House was in unanimous agreement (of those present) on both occasions that the amendment passed.

Blanton was a former judge from Abilene, Texas. He held ranching interests in that area. He served in the 65th and five succeeding Congresses before resigning to run unsuccessfully for the Senate in 1928. He returned to Washington with the 71st Congress in 1930 and served until defeat in 1936. He died on his Texas ranch in 1957.[60]

Besides fighting the USES on the floor of the House, Blanton was a colorful witness before the Joint Senate-House Labor Committee hearings on the Kenyon-Nolan Bill for a permanent national employment service. He produced witnesses who charged the USES was forcing government

employees to join the National Federation of Federal Employees.[61] He produced letters and editorials from the San Antonio Express which alleged that the local USES head, H. W. Lewis, was calling for his defeat.[62]

The issue of organized labor was a particularly intense one in Texas. When an unskilled labor shortage developed early in the war, the USES was instrumental in the importation of a large number of migrant Mexican workers. This was not in itself unusual since Texas has traditionally depended upon both legal and illegal Mexican labor. What was unusual is that President Wilson had issued an executive order in June 1918 directing that all hiring of unskilled labor be done through the USES. Further, the federal mediation of wartime labor disputes seemed to favor the cause of organized labor.[63] This culminated in a decision of the War Labor Board on February 21, 1919 against contractors and for a carpenters union in San Antonio.[64] Congressman Blanton saw the unionization of south Texas through the agency of the federal USES and migrant Mexican laborers as a future possibility.

The feisty congressman became something of a hero to his constituents when Samuel Gompers used the June 1919 AFL convention in Atlantic Beach as an occasion to attack Blanton. The page one story was headlined "Gompers Flays Blanton" and the union leader went on to say, "As time goes on, Blanton will be eliminated or left at home as others of his stamp have been."[65]

The San Antonio Express, which had used the USES material attacking Blanton, printed none of the controversy from the floor of the House or the labor committee hearings. On June 28, it did print USES Director General Densmore's denial of Blanton's charges before the committee.[66] The same story reported the adoption of House Resolution No. 225. That resolution called for an investigation of Densmore's and the USES's involvement in the San Francisco trial of labor leader Tom Mooney.

The next evolution of this scenario occurred in October 1919. In a long speech on the floor of the House, John I. Nolan of California revealed that the Blanton charges contained in the House resolution offered in June (H. Res. 225) were not only false but were the result of an act of entrapment by Department of Labor employees. Nolan then called for a censure of Blanton, asserting that he was an agent of the National Association of Manufacturers. The censure motion failed and for that matter so did the Kenyon-Nolan Bill.[67]

If the Blanton case contained comic elements, the Mooney case had elements of the tragic. Thomas J. Mooney was one of four labor leaders convicted of the 1916 San Francisco Preparedness Day bombings that killed ten and wounded forty. Mooney and Warren K. Billings were sentenced to death. The case fragged on through the 1930's, involving the Supreme Court, a Presidential Commission, the President himself, and the international labor movement.

What is of concern is the actions of the Director General of the USES, John B. Densmore.

Criticism of the USES was both general and specific. As the House and Senate bills were referred to committee, congressional criticism concentrated upon the Mooney case. House Resolution 128 was adopted June 27, 1919 and referred to Secretary of Labor Wilson. The resolution consisted of three specific questions:

> 1. What connection in behalf of the Department of Labor, if any, has John B. Densmore, now Director of the United States Employment Service, had with the case of Thomas J. Mooney, convicted in California of crime, stating in detail the activities of said Densmore concerning said case, and the expenses of same itemized that were paid by the Government, and upon what authority of law, attaching copies of all reports concerning same made to the Department of Labor by said John B. Densmore.
>
> 2. What connection in behalf of the Department of Labor, if any, since the punishment of said Thomas J. Mooney was commuted to life imprisonment, has any employee of said Department of Labor had with the said case of Thomas J. Mooney, stating such activities in detail, the purposes thereof, the expense itemized in connection therewith that has been paid or is to be paid by the Government, and upon what authority of law, attaching copies of all reports made to the Department of Labor concerning said case?
>
> 3. What requests on the Department of Labor, if any, have been made by a grand jury or a court in California for said John B. Densmore to appear in California to give evidence, and what action concerning same was taken by the Department of Labor?[68]

Secretary Wilson refused to release all the information to Congress, specifically the financial records. However, a copy of the Densmore investigation was attached to the report. Densmore had initiated the investigation at the direction of the Secretary of Labor. He pursued it

that is of interest to the members of the Interior Committee of the Civil Code Revision.

Definition of the term was left general and specific. As the terms and terms will have referred to conventional activities established upon the Master Code. Some resolutions [illegible] was adopted June 27, 1919 and referred to Secretary of [illegible] Civil Code. The resolution submitted of three specific questions:

1. What conservation in behalf of the Department of Labor, if any, has been [illegible] the Director of the United States Employment Service, and with the [illegible] of [illegible] Bureau, associated in [illegible] of [illegible], dealing in detail the activities of said [illegible] existing said case, and the extension of same [illegible] shall have been paid by the Government, and upon what authority of law, attaching copies of all reports concerning same made to the Department of Labor by said [illegible].

2. What conservation in behalf of the Department of Labor, if any, either the [illegible] of said [illegible] [illegible] was conducted in City [illegible], that any employees of said [illegible] of Labor did with the said [illegible] of [illegible] Bureau, stating what activities in detail; the purchase thereof, the expense incident if connection therewith that have been paid or is to be paid by the Government, and upon what authority of law, attaching copies of all reports made to the Department of Labor concerning said cases.

3. What recourse is the Department of Labor, if any, have been made by a [illegible] into or a court in California for said [illegible]. Reference to cases in California to give evidence, and also writing concerning same was taken by the Department of Labor.

Secretary Wilson refused to release all the information to Congress, especially the financial records. However, a copy of the Canadian Investigation was attached to the report. Congress had initiated the investigation of the activities of the Bloodsuckers of Labor. He planned it

in his capacity as a former solicitor of the Labor Department and the general authority of immigration authorities to investigate and deport aliens. He stated in the report that he had two tactical approaches to the investigation; one open, the other secret.

> The first was to select a number of special operatives, start at the beginning, and conduct a searching and thorough inquiry into every phase of the case, including the antecedent incidents, past history of the principals, the crime itself, and then, of course, the actual handling of the case by the prosecution. In an investigation of this scope and character it would have been necessary to be clothed with the power to summon witnesses and administer oaths, and it would not have been long before the whole operation would have been handicapped by the widest publicity.
>
> The alternative plan was to proceed secretly, with but two or three men, and make no move that would attract attention, either from the prosecution, the defense, or the corporate interests of the city of San Francisco. This second and less spectacular method had its drawbacks, which however, were more than balanced by its obvious advantages. It was therefore decided to work secretly.[69]

Mr. Densmore went on to describe how more than two months of careful and clever work was required to place a dictaphone and the attendant problems of background noise, etc. Verbatim and reconstructed transcripts for the period September 5, 1918 through October 26, 1918 follow, the general conclusion of which was that the district attorney had, in fact, framed Mooney and his associates by a combination of bribery, perjury, and other unsavory acts. Densmore concluded his report:

> The issue involved is immeasurably larger than the city and county of San Francisco. On the day that the State supreme court confessed that it was without power in the premises the issue became larger even than the sovereign State of California. The fact is that in its true proportions it is an issue not unworthy to be ranked with the other great problems arising out of the war now being waged for the rights of man and the liberation of peoples.
>
> With these facts uppermost in mind, it seems but logical, in bringing this report to a close, to suggest that it would be well within the province and privilege of the Federal Government to devise some means by which, without giving offense to the duly constituted and honestly functioning authorities of the city and county of San Francisco, these several defendants would be assured of those rights before the law which are guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.[70]

The Kenyon-Nolan Bill failed. In fact, it failed in every succeeding Congress until 1932. Herbert Hoover vetoed the bill that year; however, the much modified legislation was finally signeddinto law in 1933 by Franklin Delano Roosevelt as the Wagner-Peyser Act.[71] It did not include a USES of far-flung proportions. Today's employment service is basically an information and classification activity.

To Whom the Spoils

The failure of the Kenyon-Nolan Bill and other social justice bills was due to the overly zealous activities of subordinate officials in the Labor Department. Secretary W. B. Wilson seemed sincerely regretful in his report to Congress, and Densmore, shortly afterward, was dropped from government service. However, the incidence of scandal did not deter Densmore any more than it Creel or

Babson. Long before the Armistice they had recognized the central fact that whoever controlled the information to America's laboring class certainly influenced economic policy. The managerial revolution had put a new premium upon the man who could communicate to both labor and capital.

The mutual recognition of the changes led to a jurisdictional dispute between the CPI and the Department of Labor. It was essentially a controversy of appropriations allocation and function. Creel insisted that his committee was the single, central information source and brought his former boss William L. Chenery into the CPI to take over the publicity of the Labor Department in the spring of 1918.[72] This activity consisted of issuing a weekly labor letter. Creel stated his position in the June 1918 testimony to the Appropriations Committee.

> When Mr. Babson came here his idea was to issue bulletins to the manufacturers telling them how they should regard capital. I thought my problems were sufficiently delicate without adding those to my list, and I transferred Mr. Babson to the Department of Labor. Mr. Babson does not release a single thing to the press.[73]

Babson was not technically concerned with press releases. The information function with which he identified was on a loftier level than press releases. His Information and Education Division was concerned with the likes of W. H. Taft and Felix Frankfurter in the policy sphere. Besides the ubiquitous USES, he had direct access to the National War Labor Board and the War Labor Policies Board.

The organizational experience of the Council of National Defense was duplicated within the Department of Labor. Babson's very sympathetic 1919 biography of William B. Wilson describes the organizational process. The President's Mediation Commission had traveled the United States from the summer of 1917 to January 1918. It was led by William B. Wilson and Felix Frankfurter was counsel.[74] After inquiring into capital-labor conditions throughout the United States, the commission submitted a report to the President. The Secretary of Labor appointed an advisory council for his department, composed of many of the same men. The public, National Industrial Conference Board (NICB), AFL composition formula was used.[75] The Advisory Commission (parent to the Advisory Council, and mainly the same men), recommended a considerable expansion of the department to Secretary Wilson March 29, 1918.[76] President Woodrow Wilson confirmed the recommendations by proclamation April 8, 1918, renaming the Advisory Council the National War Labor Board (NWLB). The functions of this board were "to adjust labor disputes in fields of production necessary to the effective conduct of the war."[77] Further, in order to coordinate the multiplying governmental agencies dealing with labor, it was necessary to create a War Labor Policies Board (WLPB) under Mr. Felix Frankfurter. Indeed, the "Government had become the greatest employer in the country."[78]

Like the CPI, the WLPB and the NWLB were casualties

of the economy drive following the Armistice. Unlike the CPI, some of the employees were able to find a place in the Department of Labor. Roger Babson moved toward taking control of the Official Bulletin of the CPI. He began publishing the United States Bulletin as a commercial venture and continued to do so until 1920 when he merged it with his other publications.[79]

This particular issue became a cause célèbre and continued into 1924. The report of Senator Smoot's Joint Committee on Printing presents the congressional view. What is important is that the storm had not yet broken in May 1919 when the special session of Congress convened. The Joint Committee began its investigating in August 1919.[80]

George Creel resisted the foreclosure of his committee's operations until the cause was hopelessly lost. When he had contracted more trouble than he could handle, he transferred his domestic information function to the Labor Department. Roger Babson assumed the Official Bulletin while retaining his position with the department. Even John B. Densmore received assets. Mary E. Shick was a clerk in the Service Bureau of the CPI. This bureau was the central information point for the entire federal government from March 19, 1918 until the CPI demise. Creel placed her with Densmore March 21, 1919. Densmore acknowledged placing her and went on to Creel about his own plans:

"I shall endeavor to raise funds, privately, to carry on a public information bureau in Washington, which will without charge give disinterested information on Governmental activities."[81]

Promotions, Politics, and Profits

It was not only the much-maligned CPI which was embroiled in controversy. The Department of Labor was involved in very fundamental issues which the Congress did not concede to be a proper sphere of activity for the Labor Department.

The post-war economic situation was the paramount issue. The relations between capital and labor, the implications of the managerial revolution, and the newly realized potential of modern communications had political implications which could not be--and were not--ignored. Those men--George Creel, Carl Byoir, John Densmore, and Roger Babson--who were most experienced in the information functions of the government were in the best position to exploit the new conditions. If the wartime organizations could be maintained and funded, those organizations could continue centralized, federal direction of the nation. Babson's concluding remarks in the W. B. Wilson biography address the principle of government ownership of the means of production. New economic units were coming, the question was in what form.

The United States held an impregnable economic

"I shall endeavor to make Public Publicity to serve as a public information service to individuals, which will withdraw advice with discriminating information on controversial activities."[2]

Investigations, Liaisons and Profile

It was not only the anti-militant CIO Union that benefited in publicity. The Department of Labor was involved in many investigations which dampened CIO zeal enough to be a powerful element of publicity for the Labor Department.

The pretense existed strongly for two reasons. The relations between capital and labor, the legislations of the management monitoring, and the newly awakened potential of modern communications had political implications which could not be ignored were non-existent. Those non-interns (Israel, Dael Wolfe, John Dunsmore, and Homer Jamesson--who were more experienced in the intricacies functions of the government) were in the best position to exploit the new conditions. If the Wagner Act could be maintained and Frankel, Edward Director of the Wolfson-Jamison's committee reserve in the U. S. Civil Liberties enforce the potential or progressive necessity of the means of production. Two economic suits were useless, the question was in what form.

The United States built an international economic

position following the war. Gold reserves, war debts, the dismantling of the German, Austrian, and Turkish empires; and startling increases in United States productive capacity propelled the country to economic preeminence. The question was not "if" future prosperity, but "how much." Accordingly, the economic issue was intertwined with the domestic political issue.

The position of the Wilson Administration was clear. That position also included many attitudes and policies of Theodore Roosevelt's Progressives and even the previous policies of conservative Republicans. W. H. Taft's support of the League of Nations, his participation of the NWLB, and his whole-hearted support of unionization and collective bargaining were symbolic of the change in attitudes.[82]

The opposite view accepted the principle that there would inevitably be price instability and great unemployment in times of great social change. These fluctuations of the business cycle were inevitable and public tampering was only justified in times of emergency. " . . . There was no general confidence that depression could be tempered by government action without the risk either of eliminating the self-corrective features of the cycle or simply making things worse."[83]

Joseph A. Schumpeter, the Austrian economist and political theorist, concluded: (written in 1934)

> In all cases . . . recovery came of itself . . . But this is not all: our analysis leads us to believe that recovery is sound only if it does come of itself. For any revival which is merely due to artificial stimulus leaves part of the work of depressions undone and adds to an undigested remnant of malajustment, new malajustments of its own.[84]

Viewed from the central tradition, the activities of the CPI and the USES were not merely in bad taste. Their involvement in local issues was state-controlled corruption of the political process. Their programs were thinly disguised extensions of wartime propagandizing with the intent of changing the fundamental structure of American life. Worst of all, they were viewed as hypocritical self-promoters who used the rhetoric of reformers for their own personal gain. Former Speaker of the House Joe Cannon, a junior member of the Appropriations Committee in 1919, characterized the situation:

> A good many camels got their noses under the tent during the war Emergency and they are now crowding their bodies in with an appeal to Congress that they be consecrated as the government's own. . . . They are spreading propaganda, much of it at government expense, to create public sentiment in favor of their permanent adoption; and a great many people try to apply the old proverb that public money is like holy water--free to all who seek salvation.[85]

CHAPTER II FOOTNOTES

[1]Katagiri, pp. 219-229.

[2]George Creel, How We Advertised America (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1920), p. 427; E. David Cronon, editor, The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 1914-1921 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), p. 427, 465.

[3]Mock and Larson, pp. 337-346.

[4]Hearings, Sundry, 1919, p. 1589.

[5]Ibid., pp. 1640-1649, 1663-1668.

[6]Ibid., p. 2479.

[7]Ibid., p. 2480.

[8]Ibid., p. 2482.

[9]Ibid., p. 2488-2489.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Roger W. Babson, W. B. Wilson and the Department of Labor (New York: Brentano's, 1919), p. 211, 231.

[12]37 U.S. Stat. 737 (Mar. 4, 1913).

[13]U.S. Congress, House, Hearings, Urgent Deficiency Appropriations on Account of War Expenses, 1918, before the House Appropriations Committee, 65th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1917), p. 177, 183.

[14]Ibid., p. 184.

[15]Ibid., p. 193.

[16]Ibid., p. 194-196.

[17]Arthur D. Butler, "The Public Employment Service in the United States," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin,(1951), pp. 1-26.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 215-228.

[2] Lawrence Lowell, The Government of England (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1912), p. 427; I. Jennings, Cabinet Government, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: The University Press, 1951), p. 501; Ivor Jennings, The Queen's Government (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1954), p. 127; I. Jennings, Parliament, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: The University Press, 1957), p. 127; Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Government, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: The University Press, 1959), p. 501; Ivor Jennings, The Queen's Government (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1960), p. 127; Ivor Jennings, Parliament, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: The University Press, 1961), p. 127; Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Government, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: The University Press, 1962), p. 501; Ivor Jennings, The Queen's Government (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 127; Ivor Jennings, Parliament, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: The University Press, 1964), p. 127; Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Government, 3rd ed. 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[20]Hearings Sundry 1919, pp. 1562-1563.

[21]37 U.S. Stat. 737 (1913); Babson, p. 145.

[22]28 U.S. Stat. 622 (Mar. 1, 1919). Originally H.R. 16104.

[23]41 U.S. Stat. 68 (July 11, 1919).

[24]Washington Post, Feb. 27, 1919, p. 6.

[25]Chicago Tribune, Mar. 5, 1919, p. 11. The adjournment of the Congress followed a last minute filibuster which killed several appropriation bills. This forced Wilson to call a special session, the first of the 66th Congress, on May 19, 1919. Republicans held a majority of 45 in the House and 2 in the Senate.

[26]Chicago Tribune, Mar. 4, 1919, p. 7.

[27]T.M. McMahon, "The Strike in Seattle," The Survey, March 8, 1919, pp. 821-826.

[28]New Republic, Feb. 22, 1919, p. 106.

[29]Don D. Lescohier and Elizabeth Brandeis, History of Labor in the United States, 1896-1932 (New York: MacMillan and Co., 1935), p. 205.

[30]Seattle Union Record, Feb. 3, 1919, p. 4.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Address by William Piggott, CND Mss., Series 2 B5, Box 107; World's Work, April, 1919, p. 600. The normally sober and staid magazine commented, "A conglomeration of aliens from Finland and Russia attempted to give American Bolsheviks an example by establishing a soviet in a Washington city, but Mayor Hanson announced that the first 'reformer' to interfere with (city) operations would be shot . . . it immediately dissolved the 'revolution.'"

[33]Seattle Union Record, Feb. 3, 1919, p. 4.

[34]U.S. Congress, House-Senate, Hearings National Employment System, before the Joint Labor Committee, 66th Cong., 1st sess., pursuant to S. 688, S. 1442, H.R. 4305 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1919), p. 12. (Hereafter Hearings, NES.)

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[35]Seattle Union Record, April 5, 1919, p. 2.

[36]Ibid., Feb. 20, 1919, p. 2.

[37]CND Mss., Series 2 B5, Box 107.

[38]Ibid.

[39]Hearings, NES, p. 71.

[40]Ibid., pp. 71-73.

[41]Ibid., pp. 5-6.

[42]Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: MacMillan and Company, 1960), pp. 343-344.

[43]New Republic, Feb. 15, 1919, pp. 81-84.

[44]The Survey, Feb. 8, 1919, pp. 663-666.

[45]Ibid., April 5, 1919, p. 57.

[46]Allen F. Davis, "The Women's Trade Union League," Labor History, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter, 1964), 3. Raymond Robins was a Red Cross official who in late 1918 strongly recommended recognition of the Lenin government.

[47]Life and Labor, April 1919, p. 97.

[48]The Federal Employee, Vol. IV, June 1919, p. 352.

[49]Ibid., October 1919, p. 601.

[50]Industry, p. 4.

[51]Ibid., p. 4.

[52]Ibid., p. 1.

[53]Ibid.

[54]Congressional Record, Feb. 28, 1919, p. 4624.

[55]Industry, June 1, 1919, p. 9.

[56]Hearings, NES, pp. 149-233.

[57]Congressional Record, Feb. 28, 1919, p. 4625.

[58]Ibid., May 29, 1919, p. 423.

[59]Ibid.

[32] Omaha Daily News Journal, April 5, 1919, p. 2.

[33] Ibid., Dec. 20, 1919, p. 2.

[34] Ibid., Dec. 14, 1919, p. 12.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Omaha Bee, p. 12.

[37] Ibid., pp. 23-27.

[38] Ibid., pp. 3-5.

[39] Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Macmillan and Company, 1922), pp. 247-248.

[40] Omaha Bee, Feb. 15, 1919, pp. 21-22.

[41] The Survey, Feb. 8, 1919, pp. 613-616.

[42] Ibid., April 5, 1919, p. 37.

[43] Allan B. Dwyer, "The Women's Trade Union League," Labor History, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Winter, 1964), 3. Impact mentioned provisions of the Adair decision.

[44] Life and Labor, April 1919, p. 77.

[45] The Natural Resources, Vol. 17, June 1919, p. 338.

[46] Ibid., October 1919, p. 418.

[47] Leonard, p. 6.

[48] Ibid., p. 8.

[49] Ibid., p. 7.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Survey, Vol. 36, 1916, p. 6636.

[52] Leonard, June 3, 1919, p. 9.

[53] Survey, pp. 134-137.

[54] Commercial Bulletin, Vol. 30, 1919, p. 2435.

[55] 1919, May 29, 1919, p. 643.

[56] Ibid.

[60]U.S. Congress, House, Document No. 442, Bibliographical Directory of the American Congress (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1961). (Hereafter Biblio. Dir.)

[61]Hearings, NES, pp. 153-161.

[62]Ibid., pp. 184-187.

[63]Ibid. See lengthy statements by William B. Wilson.

[64]San Antonio Express, Feb. 24, 1919, p. 4 (ed); Decisions of the War Labor Board.

[65]Austin American, June 14, 1919, p. 1.

[66]San Antonio Express, June 28, 1919, p. 2.

[67]U.S. Congress, House, Document No. 209, Document No. 157, 66th Cong., 1st sess.

[68]Congressional Record, Sept. 16, 1919, pp. 5849-5859.

[69]House Document No. 157, p. 7; Congressional Record, July 23, 1919, p. 3073.

[70]Ibid., p. 75.

[71]Lescohier and Brandeis, p. 208.

[72]Letter, Chenery to Creel, May 10, 1918, CPI Mss., Series 1-A1, Box 6; Moch and Larson, p. 208.

[73]Hearings, Sundry 1919, p. 54.

[74]Babson, p. 208.

[75]Ibid., p. 210.

[76]Ibid., p. 211.

[77]Ibid., p. 213.

[78]Ibid., p. 215.

[79]Mock and Larson, p. 94.

[80]Congressional Record, April 12, 1920, pp. 5561-5563.

[81]Letter, Densmore to Creel, Mar. 21, 1919, CPI Mss., Series 1-A1, Box 6; Mock and Larson, p. 71.

[60] U.S. Congress, Senate, Document No. 442, 81st Congress, 2nd Session. Report of the Secretary of the Interior Concerning Territorial Affairs. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1951). [Hereinafter cited as 81st/2, SEN. DOC.]

[61] Guerrero, op. cit., pp. 113-121.

[62] 1912, op. cit. 124-127.

[63] 1914. The Industry statements by William B. Wilson.

[64] San Antonio Express, Feb. 24, 1919, p. 4 (Hdl): Decisions of the Tax Labor Board.

[65] Austin Statesman, June 14, 1919, p. 1.

[66] San Antonio Express, June 29, 1917, p. 3.

[67] U.S. Congress, House, Document No. 109, Document No. 157, 66th Cong., 1st sess.

[68] Compensation Record, Sept. 14, 1918, pp. 5949-5979.

[69] House Document No. 157, p. 71; Compensation Record, July 29, 1918, pp. 5012.

[70] 1914, p. 14.

[71] Labor and Principle, p. 104.

[72] Labor, Chapter 14 Civil, Tex. 10, 1918, 171 Sess. Laws 1-41, Sec 87 Hdl and Labor, p. 117.

[73] Martin, Twelve 1919, p. 11.

[74] Wilson, p. 113.

[75] 1914, p. 116.

[76] 1914, p. 211.

[77] 1914, p. 213.

[78] 1914, p. 113.

[79] Work and Laws, p. 84.

[80] Compensation Record, April 12, 1919, pp. 4301-4307.

[81] Labor, Chapter 14 Civil, Sec. 13, 1919, 171 Sess. Laws 1-41, Sec 87 Hdl and Labor, p. 71.

[82]Babson, p. 233.

[83]John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958), p. 104.

[84]Ibid., p. 45, 105.

[85]U.S. Congress, House, Document No. 264, 66th Congress 1st sess., p. 6.

CHAPTER III

TURNING THE COUNTRY AROUND

General

The domestic political activities of the Committee on Public Information (CPI) were covert as its director, George Creel, protested that his committee was not involved in partisan politics. The United States Employment Service (USES) protested that its activities were above politics and directed toward fundamental issues of social justice. To the extent that these wartime agencies were refused appropriations and their officers returned to private life, their importance as governmental institutions receded. The political debate remained; but, the retrospective view must subordinate their lasting influence to more important institutions. The CPI and the USES failed the basic political test--they did not survive.

The War Department did survive. It was concerned with the activities of all other departments and agencies and, as in all previous wars, carried the brunt of controversy and responsibility. Two main issues in early 1919 were demobilization and post-war military policy. Like the other executive agencies, the War Department was under the scrutiny of Congress for fiscal 1920 appropriations.

That scrutiny soon exposed issues which would have profound political implications.

Demobilization

The magnitude of potential problems can be quantified superficially. Friendly sources estimated organized labor to be about four million workers.[1] The Socialist Party had polled almost one million votes in 1912. However, there were more than four million Americans in arms. Of these, more than two million were overseas.[2] Popular perceptions of demobilized soldiers could not be sanguine. Beginning with the Petrograd soviets of soldiers and sailors overthrowing the Kerensky government in 1917, the French mutinies in the trenches in 1917, and finally the Sparticist revolutionaries active in Germany, the public had good reason to be apprehensive of large numbers of discontented former soldiers.[3]

The Armistice had caught the Administration largely unprepared for demobbing.[4] When plans were developed, they were largely dependent upon war-time agencies such as the USES, the War Industries Board (WIB), and the National War Labor Board (NWLB). As Congress progressively cut appropriations for the special agencies, the responsibilities for demobilization were shifted to local units and existing executive departments. When the USES failed to receive an appropriation, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker appointed

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Demobilization

The magnitude of potential problems can be quantified superficially. Friendly sources estimated organized labor to be about four million workers.[2] The socialist party had polled almost one million votes in 1912. However, there were more than four million Americans in arms. Of these, many than two million were overseas.[3] Popular perceptions of demobilized soldiers could not be sanguine. Beginning with the Bolshevik revolts of soldiers and sailors overthrowing the Kerensky government in 1917, the French mutinies in the trenches in 1917, and finally the Spartacist revolutionaries active in Germany, the public had good reason to be apprehensive of large numbers of disciplined former soldiers.[4]

The Socialists had sought the demobilization largely unprepared for demobbing.[5] When plans were developed, they were largely dependent upon old-line agencies such as the USES, the War Industries Board (WIB), and the National War Labor Board (NWLB). As Congress precipitously cut appropriations for the special agencies, the responsibilities for demobilization were shifted to local units and existing executive departments. Thus the task failed to include an appropriation, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker appointed

as a special assistant for soldiers' transition, Arthur Woods.[5]

Colonel Woods had an interesting war. A former New York City Police Commissioner (1914-1918) of impeccable Republican credentials, Woods was a Harvard graduate and former reporter for the New York Evening Sun and had also attended the University of Berlin. He married into the J. P. Morgan family in 1916 and eventually became a director of the Banker's Trust Company, the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, and a Trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation.[6]

Woods began his government service with the CPI as Associate Director for Foreign Propaganda in February 1918. He was commissioned a colonel (Aviation) in March, promoted to full colonel in August 1918, and served three months in France--September through November 1918. He received the Chevalier Legion du Honeur, the Distinguished Service Medal and the British Companion to St. Michael and St. George; was discharged in January 1919, and then assisted the Secretary of War to September 1919.[7]

The War Department program was primarily a matter of demobilizing as quickly as possible. As disorganized and confusing as it seems in retrospect, this program was effective. General Peyton C. March, Chief of Staff, used a system of unit and geographical redistribution throughout the country.[8] By mid-February, more than one million had been discharged and another 305,000 embarked home from France.[9]

The Post-War Army

There were three general positions concerning the future of the U.S. Army in early 1919. All three involved political, social and economic considerations which were fundamental to questions of national policy. The options were: (1) to return to 1916 levels of manpower and organization, (2) to increase the size of the standing army, or (3) to base all force calculations upon the idea of Universal Military Training.[10]

A return to 1916 levels had much to recommend it, not the least of which was economy. Then, as now, personnel were the most expensive element in any organization. For the legislators concerned, this was also the easiest option. From the Congress's point of view, the 1916 level was, in fact, the legal level. Anything above that number was considered "war emergency" and the only substantive issue was to determine when the "war emergency" situation was over.[11] This position held great congressional support and several implicit assumptions were involved.

If the Armistice did, in fact, mark the end of the war, those men drafted into the service or mobilized in state national guard units were simply temporarily delayed in their return to civilian life. Maintaining men in uniform pending final signature of the Versailles documents was at best a legalistic evasion, and at worst executive usurpation of the congressional prerogative of raising

and maintaining armies.

An increase in the size of the standing army was the position generally associated with General March and the General Staff.[12] The figure most often mentioned was 500,000 and the Wilson Administration provided lukewarm support for this option.[13] The very untidy world situation provided ample justification for such a force. However, considering the world situation as a part of the equation depended very largely upon acceptance of the assumption that the U.S. would be involved militarily in international affairs.

Military involvement was in fact the case at the time. There were troops on the Archangel and Siberian fronts as well as an occupation force on the Rhine. The chaotic rush to mobilize in 1917 also recommended a force of this magnitude. In short, current realities and the immediate past dictated that immediate and total demobilization was impossible.

The third position which came to prominence was the idea of Universal Military Training.[14] This concept did not necessarily exclude or include either of the previous two options. Deriving as it did from ancient ideas of the citizen soldier, the minuteman, and the militia, it became a precondition to the political debate. Simply stated, the issue became the relationship of the citizen to the state in war.

The Military Intelligence Service

What have become known as the propaganda hearings of World War I had a curious history. The original investigation was a suspicion that German ethnics were using brewing interests as covers for propaganda.[15] In this sense, German propaganda was an evil connected to intemperance. It became a criminal offense to serve liquor to servicemen during the war.[16] One of the principal campaigns of Herbert Hoover's Food Administration was denying grains to liquor industries.[17]

Another common perception was that the Lenin-Trotsky faction of Bolshevists were in fact German agents provocateurs.[18] German complicity in returning Lenin to Russia via the Finland Station, combined with their leftist program to remove Russia from the war, provided proof enough of the conspiracy to many. Hence the association of German propaganda, brewing interests, and Bolsheviks eventually led to conspiratorial theories involving anyone who opposed the war.

Heated recriminations continued after the war, exacerbated by Allied intervention in Siberia and the Archangel area. Domestic agitation by the Socialist-IWW faction in the U.S. was perceived as a threat to the established political parties. An unfortunate coincidence in Congressional hearings served to associate the Army's Military Intelligence Service of the General Staff with

the increasingly political investigation of the Propaganda Subcommittee.[19]

The deputy to the head of the intelligence section, Colonel William Dunn, testified as spokesman before the House Military Affairs Committee in January[20] and sought legislative authority to expand his section's peacetime strength to 77 officers.[21] Testimony showed the pathetic state of the section at the beginning of the war, when the entire intelligence apparatus consisted of one officer and one clerk.[22] By war's end, the Washington office alone had grown to 272 officers, most of them former professors and journalists.[23] Colonel Dunn testified that the general staff hoped to maintain 77 officers for various intelligence duties, one of which was domestic information collection.[24]

At the same time, a former agent of Colonel Nicholas Biddle's New York MI office was testifying before the Propaganda Committee.[25] Archibald E. Stevenson, a New York attorney, gave testimony which raised serious questions of the proper functions of the Army's general staff and the War Department. Stevenson accused the foreign language press of infiltration by German agents. He specifically identified the prestigious Staats-Zeitung, published by Herman Ridder's son, as a source of enemy propaganda. Indeed, before he finished he indicted the entire New York based liberal press. He also charged that a Brooklyn organization, the "Printer's and Publishers' Association,"

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The inquiry to the head of the Intelligence Section,
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Indeed, before he finished he indicted the entire New York
based liberal press. He also charged that a "hostility
organization, the Trotter's and Pritchard's Association,"

was a pro-German front. This implicated the current New York City Mayor John F. Hylan.[26]

Stevenson identified the causes of labor unrest for the committee. Speaking of the railroad union's proposal of government ownership of the rails, he defined syndicalism for the committee: "With syndicalism is coupled 'propaganda by deed' or 'direct action'; that is, the tactics of general strike and sabotage."[27]

Stevenson's testimony ranged far and indicted numerous individuals and organizations as pacifist, radical, pro-German and pro-Bolshevik--all of which were considered equally subversive. The Socialist mayoralty candidate, Morris Hillquit, and his associates on the "People's Council of America for Democracy and Peace," the National Civil Liberties Bureau, including Amos Pinchot; and the editors of the Dial, Public, and The Survey were major targets. The Assistant Director of New York's Federal Employment Service and a former Dean of Columbia Law School, Dr. George W. Kirchwey; Charles A. Beard and the Rand school itself; and especially Oswald Garrison Villard and John Reed were also smeared. Even the Department of Labor's Immigration Commissioner, F. C. Howe, was indicted. Stevenson was initially coy about providing the names, but he relented eventually and entire lists were inserted into the record. Senator Knute Nelson of Minnesota was a friendly interrogator and inquired, "Don't you think a good

number of Socialists have crept into the army of office-holders in this country?"[28]

The New York attorney's testimony concluded with Committee discussion of a commission to study and investigate the larger problem. Stevenson recommended a program of counter-propaganda, deportation of alien agitators, and legislation.[29] Senator Nelson stated: "You are aware that we have big constitutional lawyers here, and that in carrying on these reforms that you suggest we would run up against the gospel of free speech?"[30]

The Stevenson testimony was taken very seriously in New York, of course. It was less serious in Washington until Secretary of War Baker made it front page news by disavowing Stevenson as an employee of Military Intelligence.[31] This was followed by a gag order signed by the Chief of Staff, General March.[32] The New York Times reported "Silence Order Issued by Baker" and published the text of the general order. The policy stated was that all MI information was, firstly, confidential by its very nature. Secondly, all requests for testimony or information would be forwarded to MIS Washington for decision by the Chief of Staff personally.[33]

Baker was not technically incorrect. According to Stevenson himself, he had originally been attached to the Department of Justice. However, his actual government work in New York was with MI and Stevenson claimed a certificate

signed by Brigidier General Marlborough Churchill to prove it.[34] Senator Lee S. Overman (Democrat-North Carolina) kept the matter in the public eye by stating that the witness was in fact expedited to the committee by the War Department December 17, 1918. "It is evident that the Secretary of War did not familiarize himself with the employees of his department or the work which was being done by the bureau of Military Intelligence."[35]

Stevenson's function in all this is clear. He had gotten his start in subversive investigations as Chairman of Mayor John P. Mitchel's Committee of National Defense, Committee on Aliens. He claimed to have established the first bureau of translation of the foreign language press in 1917.[36] In the 1920's Stevenson became the legal counsel to the New York State Assembly's Lusk Committee and figured prominently in the drafting of that state's criminal anarchy legislation.[37]

Besides the explicit association of "propaganda," there were other connections of military intelligence with the CPI. Most of George Creel's contacts with the War Department were through the Military Intelligence Service. One incident involved the assistant director of the New York based Foreign Picture Service. In an undated letter to then Colonel Churchill, Creel acknowledged the transfer of draftee John Tuerk from training camp to duty with the CPI. However, Creel complained that he (Tuerk) was still

an enlisted man. The CPI chairman insisted that Tuerk be transferred to the Military Intelligence Branch and commissioned a second lieutenant "because of the confidentiality of his work."[38] Other correspondence indicates that Colonel Churchill did not relish his relationship with Creel at all. However, it is apparent that the CPI had a certain leverage through its operatives in foreign capitals. One military attaché was relieved for failure to cooperate with CPI personnel.[39]

Military Justice

Congressional opposition to the general staff's army reorganization plans was also increasing by the end of January. One of the most emotional issues raised was the administration of military justice. Rightly or wrongly, the issue was cast in terms of an authoritarian, draconian and brutal exercise of power by regular officers over citizen soldiers.

The Senate Military Affairs Committee announced hearings on the Chamberlain Bill January 26, 1919.[40] The bill was intended to reform the existing Articles of War, passed in 1916.[41] There were numerous rumors of excessive penalties for supposedly minor military offenses. A major part of the bill would change the function of the Judge Advocate General and empower him to review courts-martial by subordinate commands for legal adequacy.[42] Baker,

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JAG Enoch Crowder and the Chief of Staff insisted at the time that only the President held the power to review or grant clemency.[43]

The Acting JAG, Brigadier General Samuel Ansell, testified in favor of the Chamberlain Bill and in so doing damned the existing system. In typically reported stories headlined "Courts-Martial Called Atrocious," General Ansell gave examples of men sentenced to forty years for refusing to drill.[44]

After the original sensationalism of the Acting JAG's testimony, the issue devolved into an intramural struggle over general staff, bureau and regular-national guard control of military policy. In mid-February, the controversy developed into the right of the soldier to freedom of speech.

Congressman James Gallivan of Massachusetts, a loyal, labor-oriented, Administration Democrat established himself as an enemy of the regular army faction denoted as the "Leavenworth clique."[45] On February 2, he read into the Congressional Record a letter signed by forty wounded officers. The lengthy letter alleged that the regular officers were an autocracy aligned against General Leonard Wood and all National Guard and Reserves, that the Service of Supply (SOS) was full of regulars while the front lines were manned by reserves, and that when the fighting was over, General Headquarters pets arrived at the front and

the reserves were sent to Blois for "canning." The bitter letter went on:

> How many men above the rank of Capt. were wounded? . . . scores of men were sacrificed because the officers in command were ambitious for promotion and ordered needless advances . . . our part in the war was a success not because of the skill of our high command, but in spite of it. . . . We have known this all along, but what could we do? We were muzzled . . . you're the champion to take the muzzle off . . . .[46]

These events provided powerful support to congressional critics of the Administration. The court-martial issue refused to go away and matters were not improved when Baker announced Ansell was being reverted to his pre-war rank of lieutenant colonel as of March 10, 1919.[47] Despite assurances that the reversion had nothing to do with the controversy, Congressman James Gould of New York stated Ansell was punished for testifying "in that he answered a summons which he couldn't decline and told the Congress of the U.S. the truth about a matter which it was clearly the duty of Congress to inquire into."[48]

Ansell's replacement, Brigadier General E. A. Kreger, had the same date of rank as Ansell. He reported for duty at the Washington JAG office after an unsuccessful trip to France and an attempt to secure the court martial records of the AEF.[49] General John J. Pershing would not provide them. JAG Enoch Crowder returned from a trip to Cuba and accused Ansell of political maneuvering.[50] Crowder, author of the 1916 Articles of War, stated that his

colleague Ansell had not objected to the stringency of the punishments when he had helped draft the bill in 1916. Crowder went on to say the fault, if there was any fault in the war situation, was with Congress. The public debate over the issue was silenced when the matter was turned over to the Inspector General for investigation.[51]

These incidents, taken in conjunction and occurring during early February, led to a floor action which is fundamental to the consideration of the gag law. It should be borne in mind that the gag law was first proposed on the floor of the House February 28, 1919, and in conjunction with an appropriation bill.[52]

The General Staff Rebuffed

There was a great deal of legislation by amendment to appropriation bills. The Third Session, 65th Congress, was scheduled to adjourn March 4, 1919. The time element was such that hearings and legislative drafting were impractical, especially since the 65th, the "War Congress" had been a lame duck since November 4, 1918. Accordingly, there was a rush to adjourn. And yet, the substantive issues of the economy, the future size of the army and the control of communications could not be avoided. Where possible, a congressional consensus could attach riders to appropriations bills which would express the will of Congress and still, by passage and signature, provide the

executive with the funds for the nation's business.

The House session of February 15th was a stormy one. The Committee of the Whole was considering the highly controversial Army Appropriation Bill in detail and controversy. Because of the legislative log jam, the War Department and the Military Affairs Committee hoped to have the General Staff's 500,000-man army pass as an amendment to the Appropriation Bill.[53] The entire appropriation (except 14 million dollars for the National Guard) was delayed by successive charges against the War Department from the floor. Leonidas C. Dyer (Republican-Missouri) accused the Department of lying. Henry D. L. W. Flood (Democrat-Virginia) accused officers in the Washington area of abusing the use of government vehicles and had a prohibitive amendment adopted. James R. Mann (Republican-Illinois) accused the Army of discrimination against lower-ranking officers and their wives. Joseph H. Moore (Republican-Pennsylvania) damned the conditions at Brest. William R. Green (Republican-Iowa) demanded the War Department get something done about the Brest debarkation camps. Royal Johnson (Republican-South Dakota), a former member of the AEF, called the military justice system an outrage and warned that the soldiers would remember in 1920. He said he understood why the Administration had failed to support the doughboy--no son or relative of anyone in the Administration had ever been a doughboy.

Harold Knutson (Republican-Minnesota) decried the Prussianizing of the Army and said, "Let us have a little of that 'pitiless publicity' of which the Democrats spoke with so much feeling in 1912 and which we have seen so little of since March 4, 1913." The only defense of the Administration offered was by Scott Ferris (Democrat-Oklahoma), floor manager of the Appropriation Bill. He stated the abuses of the system were older than the current Administration and warned that it was harmful to preach hate and despair of the government.[54]

Following the clerk's reading of a $100,000 item for rent of buildings in the District of Columbia, Thomas D. McKeown (Democrat-Oklahoma) offered his amendment and the following exchange ensued.

> Mr. McKeown offers the following as a new paragraph: After the period at the end of line 7, page 40, insert the following: "That no part of the appropriations contained in this act shall be available if the War Department shall permit any officer to make orders, rules, or regulations prohibiting officers or enlisted men from communicating information of conditions in the Army to United States Senators or Members of the House of Representatives."
>
> Mr. Dent. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the point of order on the amendment.[55]

Hubert Dent, Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, was the Democratic Party's accountable man for military policy. His reservation of the point of order gave him the initiative toward commitment or rejection of the proposed amendment. He asked that it be reread while he read something shown him. After reading the report of

the hearings, he retracted all objections.

> Mr. Dent. I withdraw the point of order.
> Mr. Stafford. I make the point of order, Mr. Chairman.
> Mr. McKeown. Will the gentleman reserve the point of order? This is a limitation upon this appropriation bill and I do not think it is subject to the point of order.
> Mr. Stafford. Mr. Chairman, there is no question it is in the form of a limitation, but it is further true that it infringes upon the authority now vested in the executive officers of the Government. They have authority now to provide regulations under existing law. There is nothing more fundamental in the legislative precedents in the House than that if a limitation, though negative in form, is actually affirmative, so that it interfered with the discretion of an executive officer, or with any authority which the executive officer under existing law now has, it is legislation in fact, and thereby comes under the inhibition that it is legislation upon an appropriation bill.

Stafford had no reason to oppose the amendment other than the issue of riders on appropriation bills. It was bad business and subject to much abuse. The Republican minority leader answered him:

> Mr. Mann. Mr. Chairman, the amendment as offered does not require any executive branch of the Government nor anybody in the Army to do any positive thing. If it directed the War Department to do something which it was not authorized now to do, it would be legislation no matter what the form might be, but this is a mere withholding of the money appropriated if certain conditions exist. We have a right to prescribe the conditions so long as it does not direct the executive department to do something it is not now authorized to do . . . Why, certainly we may make an appropriation direct to an officer, and he may expend it as he pleases if we stop there under the law, but we can put a direction at the end of that that it shall not be spent in a certain way. That does not direct him how he shall spend it. That limits his authority as to how he shall spend it without a direction to him, changing the law.[56]

James R. Mann, soon to be the power in the Committee on Committees of the Republican 66th Congress, was a former Joe Cannon lieutenant and the most subtle parliamentarian in Congress. This exchange foretold a policy of Congressional domination of the federal government. He returned the floor to the amendment's author.

> Mr. McKeown. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I think this amendment ought to be put on this appropriation bill. You receive letters, and so do I, and at the end of the letter you will find this statement: "Do not let my name be used; do not let them know I wrote you. If you do, it means the penitentiary for me." I say it is time that this Congress went on record or took some action to protect the men who can not protect themselves and who can not be heard except through the Congressmen who represent their districts. Gag rule is un-American. We put the soldiers in the service and put them there by law. This Congress passed a law that took them whether they wanted to go or not. You can not hear from them and get the facts from them, because they are afraid they will be jerked before a court-martial. You have already seen and heard the record as to what takes place in a court-martial proceeding under the present methods. Every soldier and every officer in the Army of the United States ought to have the right to go to his Congressman or his Senator and tell him the conditions without fear of being brought up before any board and dealt with. And I hope that this amendment will carry. [Applause]
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Mr. Shallenberger. Mr. Chairman, I would like to give the gentleman from Wisconsin [Stafford] the information the committee has on this subject to which he was referring.
>
> Mr. Stafford. I have obtained that information by reading the hearings of the committee, and I withdraw the reservation of the point of order. . . .[57]

The amendment offered and accepted did not apply to the quartermaster's buildings. It modified paragraph five of the Articles of War.[58] The amendment was directed

James K. Polk, soon to be the nominee in the Committee
on Commerce of the Twenty-first Congress, was a former
Tax Census investigator and the most ardent parliamentarian
in Congress. This wedding ushered a policy of Congres-
sional domination of the federal government. He returned
the favor by his impeachment action.

Mr. Dickerson. Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, I think this appointment ought to be put on
this appropriation bill. Its enabling instrument, and so
do I, and at the end of the letter you will find this
statement: "Do not let my name be used; do not let
them know I wrote you. If you do, it ruins the pros-
pects for me." I say it is time that this Congress
went on record at such base action to protect the men
who can not protect themselves and who can not be heard
except through the Congressmen and Congresswomen their
districts. Can this is un-American. We pay the
soldiers to the service and put them there in ser-
vice Congress passed a law that took them wherever they
wanted to go or not. You can not have from them and
get the facts from them, because they are afraid they
will be jerked before a court-martial. You have
already been and heard the record as to what takes
place in a court-martial proceeding under the present
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of the United States ought to have the right to go to
his Congressman or his Senator and tell him the condi-
tions without fear of being [illegible] to bitter end
board and deals with. But I hope that this measure
will carry. [Applause]

. . . . . .

Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I yield [illegible] to
give the committee from Kentucky [Crafford] the infor-
mation the committee has on this subject to which he
was referring.

Mr. Crafford. I have obtained that information by
reading the hearings of the committee, and I [illegible]
the reservation of the point of order. . . .

The amendment offered and accepted did not apply
to the quartermaster's building. It modified paragraph
five of the Articles of War.[53] The amendment was directed

at the General Staff and the War Department.[59] Representative Dent, as Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, had the responsibility for the bill on the floor. No matter what the substantive issue, he was ultimately responsible for the bill in the House. Dent would answer to the Democratic Party and the Wilson Administration. He could object to the amendment by raising the point of order and sending the amendment back to committee. He did neither because he opposed Baker and the General Staff. Earlier, January 16, 1919, he had stated he "was not in sympathy with Baker's policy of organizing the army now, abolishing Assistant Secretaries, and putting power in the General Staff."[60]

Representative Stafford obviously did object upon the substantive issue of legislating by amendments to appropriation bills. However, he too withdrew the objection after seeing the articles. The emotional issues raised by the court-martial abuses made it difficult for any congressman to oppose the amendment.

The political issue was becoming clearer with these congressional actions. The Washington Post concluded that the restrictions were anti-Baker and his effort to restructure the Army.[61] Whatever the reason, the Military Affairs Committee shelved the 500,000-man Army issue by instructing Dent to seek a special rule.[62] This meant going to the Rules Committee which James R. Mann Controlled.[63]

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The political issue was becoming clearer with these contradictory actions. The Washington Post concluded that the restrictions were anti-Baker and his effort to restructure the Army.[61] Whatever the reasons, the Military Affairs Committee sought the "anti-gun Army issue by instructing Hull to test a special rule."[62] This meant going to the Rules Committee where James R. Mann Controlled

The General Staff's enlarged Army plans failed, although the issue would be fought over again in the September 3-November 12, 1919 Army Reorganization Hearings.[64] The die was cast in February 1919.

The issue of removing the gag from military personnel went considerably further than the Ansell-Crowder row or the unseemly activities of Archibald Stavenson. Republican congressmen had a vested interest in associating the General Staff with the Wilson Administration. Any specific abuses which occurred in the Army system could be laid at the door of the arrogant and Prussianized general staff. Nepotism, favoritism and ineptitude were charged against the Secretary of War. Writers came forward to claim they had exposed the disciplinary system as early as 1914.[65]

Once the General Staff and the Secretary of War were linked and discredited, the UMT issue became less significant. Congressional perception of UMT under a strong, centralized Department of War was, in effect, continued conscription, Army reassurances to the contrary.[66] On the other hand, UMT under state control was what had gone before, a national guard system.

The one great imponderable in February 1919 was the leader of the AEF, Pershing. All American wars had produced either a president or a strong candidate from the ranks of military leaders. The AEF commander was a prime factor in any handicapping of the 1920 presidential race.

Congressional and press criticisms were directed at the Wilson Administration explicitly. However, implicit in every criticism was a possible failing of the AEF and Pershing.[67]

Waiting in the wings was a third warrior, General Leonard Wood. His political contacts went back to the preparedness campaign of 1916. He was considered the patron saint of the National Security League, the American Defense Society, and the American Legion. As early as December 1916, he had been rebuked by Secretary of War Baker for publicly supporting UMT. Wood was an early target of a War Department "muzzle order" in February 1915. By no means was he out of political contention in early 1919, delivered the memorial address for Theodore Roosevelt at the Kansas City Chamber of Commerce meeting February 9, 1919. One opinion has it that Senators Medill McCormick and Henry Cabot Lodge prematurely adjourned the 1920 Republican convention (when Wood was leading) and rushed to the "smoke-filled room" to forestall a Wood victory.[68]

Conclusion

The General Staff became identified with the Administration prior to the recess of the 65th Congress on March 4, 1919. That meant that any national policy which the General Staff might fashion was inevitably politicized. As the international situation disintegrated, the raison

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

d'etre of the large standing army similarly fell apart. The case made for a large army to fight the Central Powers could not be indefinitely sustained. The more the Administration predicated the League and the Peace upon the presence and support of a large American Army, the more the increasing Balkanization of Europe militated against the same standing Army. There were no longer any European military threats.

The domestic situation compounded the problem. In the euphoria of victory, the participants tended to be awed by the sheer magnitude of the American effort. Memoirs cite soldiers shipped, tons amassed, ingots stacked and organizations streamlined. This efficiency, in many cases, was precisely the problem.

For many years, the intellectual leaders of the country had deplored the excesses of large, corporate capitalism. The muckrakers and various reformist groups had associated the U.S. Congress with large, powerful economic interests frustrating mass desires for social justice legislation. Judicial and legislative relief for social ills seemed increasingly remote. Suddenly, with the declaration of war, the reformers embraced the robber barons. An Administration which had fastidiously avoided even seeming to prepare for industrialized war was increasingly staffed by industrialists.

It seems reasonable to infer that there was more to the congressional furor than petty partisan politics.

Criticism of the General Staff was cast into stereotypes calculated to stimulate traditional American anti-authoritarianism. There were few votes to be gained by identification with large governmental agencies. Among other things, there were certainly a multitude of unpleasant encounters with petty bureaucrats--four-minute men, selective service boards, food and fuel priority setters and the omnipresent bond salesmen. It is reasonably safe to assume that most Americans willingly submitted to the required regimentation so long as the image of the enemy Hun was upheld. But the incredible shambles of Europe in 1919 made a mockery of the lofty Wilsonian rhetoric. The 1919 elections, the inability to reach a peace, and the developing economic strife called into question the very competence of the government.

The Mann-Cannon faction continued to exploit the growing disillusionment by linking incompetent administrators to expensive and controversial programs. There were certainly enough programs to discredit. By forcing the special session to convene in May, the standpatters gained a forum. In the many pending appropriation bills, they found a vehicle for their program. With the President and his staff in Europe, the opposition was leaderless and demoralized. When Mann gained control of the Committee on Committees, the standpatters were ready for the coming decade of dominance.

The most conventional judgment of that decade is the one which links the rise of the reactionaries and the accompanying rejection of the League to the conditions which produced Hitler and Mussolini. This interpretation became an article of faith for enlightened, liberal internationalism. Whether true or not, such speculation is academic.

The reaction engendered by the Wilson Administration's conduct of the war was an entirely legitimate political exericse. That Administration's programs failed because of an arrogant disregard of the Congress. More fundamentally, the programs were constructed and promoted in such a way as to entirely bypass Congress as an institution. The program promoters were not dishonorable or evil men. However, equally honorable men could disagree with the means as well as the ends of the numerous programs.

The examination of the large issue has developed into seeming paradox. The House of Representatives used the vehicle of a rider to an appropriation bill to restrict federal officers from communicating with congressmen on February 28, 1919. And yet, two weeks previously, the House had attached a rider to an appropriation bill mandating that officers and enlisted men not be restricted from communicating with those same congressmen.

The paradox is only apparent. The current perspective of the situation is affected by thirty years of

uninterrupted growth of federal and military bureaucracies. A large, centralized federal government is assumed today. Despite the experience of World War I, that was not an unchallenged assumption in 1919.

CHAPTER III FOOTNOTES

[1]John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy (New York: Harpers, 1960), p. 13.

[2]James R. Mock and Evangeline Thurber, Report on Demobilization (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1944), p. 128.

[3]Arno J. Mayer, Lenin vs. Wilson (New York: Meridian, 1963), pp. 22-36.

[4]Mock and Thurber, pp. 108-126.

[5]Ibid., p. 94, 210.

[6]Who's Who; 1921-1922, p. 3014. 1932-1933, p. 2508.

[7]Ibid.; Mock and Thurber, p. 94, 167, 210.

[8]Mock and Thurber, pp. 131-133.

[9]Washington Post, Feb. 16, 1919, p. 4.

[10]This categorization is premised upon the congressional perspective.

[11]U.S. Congress, House, Military Affairs Committee, Army Reorganization 1919, Hearings, 66th Cong., 1st sess., 1920, p. 1775. The question constantly recurs, often being turned against the Treaty and the League.

[12]Ibid., p. 1771.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Ibid., p. 1779.

[15]U.S. Congress, Senate, Judiciary Subcommittee, Report and Hearings, German-Bolshevik Propaganda, pursuant to Senate Resolutions 307 and 439, 65th Cong., 3rd sess., 1919. (Hereafter Propaganda Hearings.)

[16]Dixon Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home (Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1944), p. 410.

[17]Hicks, p. 177.

[18]Propaganda Hearings.

[1]John M. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy (New York: Harpers, 1921), p. 32.

[2]Lloyd R. Amos, Preconciliar Politics (Detroit: Detroit Democratic Organization (Forum, 1913). University of Oklahoma Press, 1921), p. 128.

[3]Alvin J. Meyer, Lenin on Islam (New York: Scott-Foresman, 1951), pp. 32-38.

[4]Beck and Thwaite, pp. 128-132.

[5]1914-, p. 84, 210.

[6]Time's Wake: 1871-1913, p. 3914. 1921-1971, p. 3366.

[7]1914-, Beck and Thwaite, p. 84, 107, 110.

[8]Beck and Thwaite, pp. 121-122.

[9]Presidential Post, Dec. 14, 1913, p. 4.

[10]This categorization is premised upon the contraindividual perspective.

[11]U.S. Congress, Senate, Military Affairs Committee, Army Reorganization 1915, Hearings, 64th Cong., 1st sess., 1916, p. 1775. The absolute neutrality record, often cited turned against the Tyranny and the Lexicon.

[12]1914-, p. 1781.

[13]1914

[14]1914-, p. 1915.

[15]U.S. Congress, Senate, Military Subcommittee, Report and Hearings, Defense Relations with Latin America, 64th Cong., 1st sess., 1916. (Hereafter Preparedness Hearings.)

[16]Glenn Beaver, Alan Johnny Comes Marching Home (Cambridge, Mass., Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924), p. 410.

[17]Hicks, p. 177.

[18]Preparedness Hearings.

[19]Ibid., p. 2690.

[20]Hearings, Army Appropriation, 1920. Testimony of Jan. 20, p. 67.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Ibid., pp. 73-74.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Ibid., p. 76, 81.

[25]Propaganda Hearings, p. 2690, 2785.

[26]Ibid., p. 2697, 2701.

[27]Ibid., p. 2729.

[28]Ibid., p. 2736, 2704, 2732, 2706-2707, 2781-2785.

[29]Ibid., p. 2785.

[30]Ibid., p. 2781.

[31]Washington Post, Jan. 28, 1919, p. 1.

[32]The order was not dated in the press release, but it is reasonable to assume the issuance shortly followed the first Stevenson appearance.

[33]New York Times, Feb. 1, 1919, p. 4.

[34]Propaganda Hearings, p. 2785; Washington Post, Jan. 29, 1919, p. 3.

[35]Washington Post, Jan. 29, 1919, p. 3.

[36]Propaganda Hearings, p. 2690.

[37]Norman Hapgood, Professional Patriots (New York: Harper Brothers, 1924), p. 67.

[38]CPI Mss., Serial 1-A1, Box 26.

[39]James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, Words That Won The War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), pp. 325-350.

[40]Washington Post, Jan. 26, 1919, sec. 2, p. 2.

[19] Ibid., p. [illegible].

[20] [illegible], [illegible] Corporation, 1919. Twenty of Jan. 20, p. 97.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid., pp. 73-74.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid., p. [illegible], 81.

[25] [illegible] Meetings, p. [illegible], 1783.

[26] Ibid., p. 3807, 3701.

[27] Ibid., p. 2732.

[28] Ibid., p. 2738, 3701, 3723, 3780-3807, 3741-3743.

[29] Ibid., p. 3780.

[30] Ibid., p. 2782.

[31] [illegible] Mon. 28, 1917, p. 3.

[32] The order was not dated in the court records, but it is reasonable to assume the injunction shortly followed the first demonstration announced.

[33] New York Times, Tue. 1, 1879, p. 4.

[34] [illegible] Meetings, p. 2741; Twenty-two Feet Jan. 24, 1921, p. 3.

[35] [illegible] Tool, Jan. 22, 1916, p. 6.

[36] [illegible] Meetings, p. 3809.

[37] [illegible] Journal [illegible] Time Trend [illegible] Business, 1914), p. 97.

[38] Col Use., Period 1-11, Box 12.

[39] Isaac D. Buck and Twelfth Census, Civil Fact Box The War (Protection) Education University Press, 1939), pp. 215-250.

[40] Publication Corp., Jan. 20, 1918, Sec. 2, p. 4.

[41]Hearings, Army Appropriation, 1920, Appendix 1, p. 489.

[42]Washington Post, Jan. 26, 1919, sec. 2, p. 2.

[43]Ibid., March 10, 1919, p. 1.

[44]New York Times, Feb. 14, 1919, p. 1; also Feb. 15, 20, 21, 1919.

[45]New York Times, Feb. 2, 1919, p. 11.

[46]Ibid.

[47]Washington Post, March 7, 1919, p. 1.

[48]Ibid., March 12, p. 1.

[49]Ibid., March 7, 1919, p. 1. B. G. Kreger was the relief.

[50]Ibid., March 10, 1919, p. 1.

[51]Ibid., March 12, 1919, p. 1.

[52]Congressional Record, Feb. 15, 1919, pp. 4624-4627.

[53]Lindsay Rogers, American Political Science Review, March 8, 1919, p. 255; Washington Post, Jan. 26, 1919, p. 6.

[54]Congressional Record, Feb. 15, 1919, p. 3489; Washington Post, Feb. 16, 1919, p. 1.

[55]Ibid. Stanley Hubert Dent, (D-Ala.) was chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs throughout the war. William H. Stafford (R-Wis.) was in and out of the House from 1903-1922 and often a candidate for Senator. McKeown was from South Carolina, attended Cornell, became rather well-to-do in Oklahoma oil and New York business. Ashton C. Shallenberger, (D-Neb.) was the temporary Chairman of the Democratic State Convention in 1919, a previous governor of Nebraska (1908-1911), and a delegate to the 1920 Democratic Convention.

[56]Congressional Record, p. 3493.

[57]Ibid.

[58]Washington Post, Feb. 16, 1919, p. 19; sec. 3, p. 6.

[59]Ibid.

[42] _____, _____ _____, 1910, typescript, p. 182.

[43] _____ _____, Dec. 30, 1910, sec. 2, p. 2.

[44] 1914, March 10, 1911, p. 1.

[45] _____ _____, Dec. 14, 1910, p. 1; also Feb. 15, 20, 23, 1910.

[46] _____ _____, Feb. 2, 1910, p. 12.

[47] 1914.

[48] _____, March 7, 1910, p. 1.

[49] 1914, March 11, p. 1.

[50] 1914., March 7, 1910, p. 1. U. S. Treaty was now ratified.

[51] 1914., March 10, 1910, p. 1.

[52] 1914., March 12, 1910, p. 1.

[53] _____ _____, 898 43, 1910, pp. 1014-1017.

[54] _____ _____, March 7, 1910, p. 1. _____ _____, Jan. 19, 1910, p. 4.

[55] _____ _____, Feb. 15, 1910, p. 3480.

[56] 1914. Stanley Dodore Dead. (D-Ida.) was chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs throughout the war. William O. Stafford [D-Ida.] was in and out of the House from 1933-1937 and often a candidate for Senator. Followed out from Idaho Territory, appointed Consul, became retired multi-da by Baltimore oil and New York industry. Lyman C. Shallenberger, [D-Neb.] was the temporary Chairman of the Democratic State Convention in 1917, a Bryanite supporter of Nebraska (1906-1911), and a delegate to the 1920 Democratic Convention.

[57] _____ _____, p. 3402.

[58] 1914.

[59] _____ _____, Feb. 18, 1910, p. 19, sec. 2, p. 6.

[60] 1914.

[60]Josephus Daniels, Diaries, p. 368.

[61]Washington Post, Feb. 16, 1919, sec. 3, p. 6.

[62]Ibid.

[63]Ibid.

[64]Hearings, Army Reorganization, 1919.

[65]Washington Post, March 14, 1919, p. 3. Charles J. Post was the author who claimed he had published such a series in Harper's in 1914.

[66]Hearings, Army Reorganization, 1919, p. 1783.

[67]George Rothwell Brown, a correspondent for the Washington Post, gives an interesting example of the change in mood. On Jan. 20, 1919, he was bylined in an article praising Pershing and Chaumont (1/6). By Feb. 23 (1/4), he was writing that the reorganization of the Army was a failure and the Service of Supply derelict in their use of the 41st Division (District of Columbia). The charges increasingly implicated Pershing.

[68]Peter J. Foss, "Power and Prominence Through Publicity," unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, (1968), p. 282.

[61] Joseph Dwight, Diaries, p. 567.

[62] Washington Post, Feb. 27, 1817, sec. 2, p. 9.

[63] 1813.

[64] 1814.

[65] Editors, Navy Departments, 1810.

[66] Washington Post, March 18, 1818, p. 3. Charles J. Post was the author who claimed he had published such a satire in Jeppers's in 1818.

[67] Peoples, Army Desertion, 1810, p. 1783.

[68] Thomas Hartwell Brown, a certified pilot for the Washington Post, gives an interesting example of the change in weather. On Jan. 10, 1818, he was driven in an article marketing Tarbling and Chesapeake (D/V). By Feb. 13 (D/A?), he was writing that the reorganization of the Navy was a failure and its Service of Supply Agencies in state was of the 41st Division (Director of Internals). The changes increasingly implicated Tarbling.

[69] Peter J. Post, "Navy and Presidency Thereof, Publicity," unpublished M.S. thesis, University of Virginia, (1968), p. 143.

CHAPTER IV

GETTING THE CAMELS OUT OF THE TENT

Reaction

The House of Representatives reached an explicit consensus in early 1919. By February it was generally agreed that the federal executive branch was too large and too expensive. There might be excellent reasons why this situation had come about, but the lower house had no intention of continuing the "war emergency" agencies. This is not to say that there were no small groups, even entire committees, which were promoting continuation and creation of executive agencies. The advocates of women's bureaus, labor conciliation boards, and veterans' relief even enjoyed some success.[1] But the implicit agreement in the House of Representatives was in favor of reduced federal expenditures and discontinuation of most federally administered programs.

The House initiated the celebrated "reaction" of the 1920's for special constitutional reasons. It is traditionally the revenue-raising arm of any democratic government. It is also the branch closest to the electorate. The confluence of these two principles endowed the corporate body of 435 representatives with a specific

CHAPTER IV

Choosing the Basis for the Vote

Conclusion

perspective that was generally antithetical to the executive branch and even the Senate. Only a third of the Senate had faced the electorate since 1916 and none of the executive had done so.

Senators were generally conceded to represent themselves only. The adoption of the primary and popular election had largely freed the Senator from the party discipline which had maintained when state legislatures sent them to Washington as extraordinary ambassadors. Senator Robert LaFollette of Wisconsin won a position in the Steering Committee of the upper chamber while sharing no general party position with his colleagues.[2]

Republicans in the country were looking toward 1920 with a mixture of confidence and apprehension. The 1918 congressional elections had confirmed the grassroots support. However, the experience of the 1912 Bull Moose candidacy of Theodore Roosevelt was too fresh in memory to make them complacent. Party leaders in the House were well aware of the need for a unified party. This realization had to take into account the remaining strength of the old Progressives, many of whom were in the Senate itself.[3] The practical problem of regular Republicans was to gain ideological and mechanical control of the party. Failing that, the problem was to reduce intra-party conflict and avoid a 1912-style split. The mutual objective of both standpatters and progressives was turning

out the Democrats in 1920. The standpatters held the grassroots and the Progressives held the public leadership.[4] Among the old regulars, Cannon was too ancient, Lodge uninterested in the Presidency, and Taft suspect for his service on the War Labor Board. The Progressives had all the leading lights: Leonard Wood, Elihu Root, and Robert LaFollette.[5]

Accordingly, the policies initiated by the Republican-controlled House are central to any discussion of subsequent national policy through the 1920's. The negotiations of the Treaty of Versailles and events in Europe directed the nation's attention toward the President and the Senate. But Republican organization and policies were being forged in the House of Representatives which would have a profound effect upon the future direction of the United States.

Organization of the House

The 65th Congress was due to end on March 4, 1919. Until the last hours, no one could be sure whether or not a special session would be called.[6] When Senators France, LaFollette, and Sherman filibustered several major appropriation bills into oblivion in the early morning hours of March 5, 1919, the administration was forced to call for a special session.[7] The Republican-controlled 66th Congress thus came to Washington months early. In the interim, there was a furious struggle for dominance of the

out the Democrats in 1920. The counter-thrust held the Progressives and the Progressives held the public Democratic.[6] Among the old regulars, Smith was the outstanding candidate to the Presidency, and Taft disposed for his service as the Lay Labor Board. The Progressives had all the leading liberal Democrat [illegible] and Democratic [illegible].[5]

Essentially, the political [illegible] in the depolitization-nationalized Europe was reversed to the [illegible] of conservative national policy through the 1920's. The materialism of the Treaty of Versailles and events in Europe directed the nation's attention toward the tariff and the Senate. Bad legislation [illegible] and politics were taken [illegible] in the Terms of Representative Union would have a profound effect upon the future direction of the United States.

[illegible] of the Senate

The 67th Congress was due to end on March 4, 1923. Until the last Senator [illegible] be sure whether or not a special session would be called.[7] Other [illegible] Democrats, and Democrat [illegible] Republican [illegible] Democratic Party [illegible] on the basis [illegible] March 5, 1919, the [illegible] the Senate to call for a special session.[7] The [illegible] Democrats in the Senate, there was a further struggle for [illegible] of the

Republican conference.[8]

The first battle was fought over the next Speaker of the House. The issue shaped up between Chicago's James R. Mann and Boston's Frederick H. Gillett, who won the post in conference action on February 27, 1919. Mann, however, seized control of the Committee on Committees. He had been minority leader and aspired to the Speakership. He was generally favored by the western representatives and regulars, but had been associated with anti-war and pro-German statements before the war.[10]

In conference Mann proposed that the Committee on Committees[11] be composed of one representative from each state, voting the numerical strength of Republican representation in each state. In the 65th Congress, Mann had chaired a Republican advisory committee of five to the newly created Committee on Committees. This became the Steering Committee of the House.

> The real power in the Republican House was largely lodged in the Committee on Committees, and theoretically the thirty-nine members of the committee, representing the Republican states, and each casting a vote equal to the Republican strength in the House of his state decided who should be the members of the fifty or sixty committees of the House, and constituted them as they saw fit. Actually, from the inauguration of the new system, the control of the Committee on Committees virtually passed to Mr. Mann, the Member exercising by far the greatest single personal influence in the House, and thus Mr. Mann, the Illinois veteran and former floor assistant of Cannon, became in consequence of many subtle factors the true power behind the scenes in the House, and this not only unknown to the country, but as a matter of fact very generally unknown to the House.

[illegible]

[illegible] The first battle was fought over the word [illegible] of the [illegible]. The issue stemmed [illegible] Chicago's James H. Rhodes and Taxpayer's Federation v. Gilligan, when the [illegible] post in September ruling on [illegible], 1977. There, however, judicial control of the [illegible] [illegible]- ty had been minutely limited and subjected to the [illegible] ly case presently [illegible] by the express [illegible] and regulatory [illegible] and home [illegible] with municipal and pre-[illegible] ordinances [illegible] the way.[17]

In [illegible] there [illegible] that the [illegible] on Community[18] in [illegible] of the [illegible] state, vesting the [illegible] authority of [illegible] [illegible] municipal in such state. In the Ohio Supreme, there had existed a [illegible] authority [illegible] of life in the early [illegible] Constitution or Constitution. This became the [illegible] Constitution of the [illegible].

The [illegible] [illegible] in the [illegible] [illegible] was [illegible] lodged in the Constitution of Community, and [illegible] nally the [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible], and [illegible] [illegible] a role equal to the [illegible] [illegible] in the [illegible] of its state derived into [illegible] in the [illegible] of the [illegible] of state [illegible] of the [illegible], the [illegible] time as this was [illegible]. Authority from the [illegible] of the new [illegible] the [illegible] of the [illegible] Constitution is [illegible] limited to [illegible], there the [illegible] [illegible] by the [illegible] state [illegible] personal [illegible] in the [illegible], and thus [illegible], the [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible], [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] of many [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] in the [illegible], and this not only [illegible] in the [illegible], but as a matter of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in the [illegible].

> In dominating the committee which assigned the committee places to the Republican membership of the House Mr. Mann controlled the right of reward and punishment, and in any organization, in any form of society, that is an attribute of power.[12]

It is the connection with "Czar" Cannon that brings the perspective to the gag law. The venerable congressman from Illinois is something of a grey eminence behind all the vengeance-taking of the Republicans in the House. Mann had been Cannon's defender and aide in the 1910 insurgency.[13] Cannon had suffered most from the Progressive movement in the party. It was "Cannonism" that had been the target of the muckrakers, reformers, and social responsibility promoters prior to 1910. Further, it was the 1910 insurgency which had ended legislative dominance of the federal government.[14] The very word "gag" is etymologically associated with the procedures of democratic, legislative bodies.[15]

The 1910 Insurgency

Great pressures of social change were under way during the two administrations of Theodore Roosevelt. The Rough Rider's decision not to run in 1908 set off a struggle within the party which led to the abortive Progressive Party movement in 1912. The roots of the internal struggle were economic: the tariff issue and anti-injunction legislation.[16]

Cannon went to the GOP convention of 1908 as a possible candidate. The popular view of Theodore

Roosevelt's years tends to obscure the real power of the Congress. As the undisputed master of the House, Cannon was a preeminent party leader.[17] When the convention opened, there were strong pressures from progressives for the party to abandon its traditional position of the high protective tariff. Implicit in this argument was a reshaping of the revenue-raising apparatus of the government.[18]

Cannon also went to the convention to defend his stewardship of Congress. He had the responsibility of stopping most of the progressive legislation of the Roosevelt Administration. Those proposals were later enacted by Taft and Wilson, but only after the Speaker had been stripped of his power by the 1910 insurgency.[19] But at the convention of 1908, Cannon held the Congress, the Republican Party, and the country to a platform which rejected the growing claims of organized labor.[20] His stubbornness cost him the Presidential nomination in 1908, the traditional powers of the Speakership in 1910, and his congressional seat and seniority in 1912.[21] Whether he was right or wrong, he was certainly consistent.

When progressive Republican representatives crossed the aisle to vote with the Democratic minority on March 19, 1910, the specific effect was to remove the Speaker from the Committee on Rules, make that committee one of ten members vice five, and provide for the election of the

members vice their appointment by the Speaker. What resulted was a lessening of party regularity.[22] From the centralized, absolute power of the Speaker there devolved the baronial fiefdoms of the committee chairmen. The major committees had gotten control of their own appropriations in 1885 during a previous insurgency. The result of that change in the organization of the House was:

> . . . the beginning of executive interference in legislation which has led to executive dominance in legislation for appropriations to meet the demands of the spenders instead of the demands of the taxpayers.[23]

The standpatters' position as regards party irregularity was that insurgency resulted in dissipation of authority, which led to the diffusion of responsibility, which in turn made the Congress vulnerable to the promotions of special interests.[24] Those interests were not evil in themselves, whether bankers' or labor leaders'. But if party discipline could not be enforced in the House of Representatives, the members would inevitably become the creatures of outside agencies rather than their constituents.[25]

The Third Deficiency Appropriations Act

Fiscal chaos reigned in the government as the 3d session, 65th Congress drew to a close. To the disorganization of the House was added the far-flung requirements of a government in the throes of its first world war. There were few social problems which did not have their

own executive agency created by executive order and initially funded by executive emergency appropriation. The Republican minority in early 1919 saw their task as pruning the executive branch fiscally and politically in preparation for the 1920 elections. A second task, not unrelated to the first, was to force President Wilson to call a special session as soon as possible. This would bring the Republican 66th Congress into being early. To finance his administration, Wilson was forced to convene the hostile Congress. To compound the irony, he had publicly asked the country to give him a Democratic majority on election eve.[26]

Most of the emergency agencies' appropriations were in the deficiency appropriation sponsored by the Appropriations Committee.[27] Kentucky Democrat Swagar Sherley was lame duck chairman, defeated by labor defections in Louisville despite a special plea from the President.[28] The bill was introduced February 28, 1919, and the senior minority member, James W. Good of Iowa, proposed the following amendment:

> That no part of the money appropriated by this act shall be used for any personal services or to pay for any advertisement, telegram, letter, or circular designed to defeat or enact any proposed legislation of Congress, or to influence any Member of Congress to vote on any appropriation unless specifically authorized.[29]

Discussion quickly got around to the lobbying efforts of the United States Employment Service (USES).

Congressman Thomas L. Blanton (Democrat-Texas) led the attacks on the USES, the Department of Labor, and Samuel Gompers. Those lobbying efforts were generally recognized as not being a legitimate exercise of the executive branch. Representative Good admitted, " . . . it ought not to be necessary to pass amendments of this kind."[30] He also hinted that if the amendment were adopted, it should be made general and should apply to all appropriations rather than being limited only to the Third Deficiency Appropriation Act.[31]

Congressman Stafford (Republican-Wisconsin) took him up and moved that the words "or any other" be inserted. This meant that, if accepted, the amendment would apply to the use of all appropriations. Stafford admitted the amendment was subject to a point of order. He referred to the Senate-originated provision in the Sundry Civil Bill (March 1, 1919) canceling all governmental publications which did not have congressional approval. "There are connected with the Government 47 publicity bureaus, and every one, on occasion, resorts to the practice that is sought to be discontinued by the pending amendment."[32]

James Gallivan (Democrat-Massachusetts), one of four representatives who voted to continue funding the USES,[33] attempted a diversion by linking the amendment to the franking privilege. This brought on another anti-labor tirade from Blanton and defense from strong labor state

representatives such as Cooper of Ohio.[34] The floor manager, Swagar Sherley, terminated debate by acquiescing to the sense of the House:

> . . . I do not believe in riders upon an appropriation bill. I think they are a mistake, but the House seems to want to legislate on this matter. If they do, I am willing for the House to express its opinion and I will not make the point of order. . . .[35]

The amendment passed and the bill went to the Senate where it died along with other major appropriations in a Republican filibuster. It was largely unnoticed by the press. The Associated Press carried the story that " . . . an amendment proposed by Rep. Good of Iowa forbids the use of money provided by the bill by government agencies in propaganda designed to perpetuate themselves."[36]

The more specialized trade and business magazines were gearing up for an assault against the Wilson Administration's labor policies. The March Governors and Mayors Conference, the coming hearings on the National Employment Service, and the arguments for continued government operation of communications utilities stimulated a vigorous reaction. Industry magazine, established in December 1918 and edited by Henry Harrison Lewis, led the battle against bureaucrats in general and the USES in particular. Every biweekly issue from January to August 1919 carried two or more atticles attacking the administration's labor policy. The March 1 issue stated:

> Some action should be taken by Congress to prevent placeholders using public funds for perpetuation of their jobs. The news are filled with statements . . . Someone paid for the thousands of telegrams which deluged Congress. The Post Office Department paid for carrying franked letters for the same purpose. The taxpayer in the ultimate analysis pays . . . [37]

Although other trade and business periodicals echoed the same themes, Industry was the most strident. World's Work, edited by Arthur Page in March 1919, described the Lewis magazine as " . . . a paper published at Washington in the interest of the employers."[38]

A conservative, traditional economic program was a major theme of the Republican Party through the 1920 elections. This theme was their interpretation of the voters' message in the 1918 congressional elections. The tendency toward a larger bureaucracy and the promotion of the bureaucracy's programs were inextricably linked to the federal budget issue. The House was the only appropriate agency to reduce expenditures since the Senate was so spendthrift that it rarely reduced appropriations.[39] The war had greatly aggravated this trend.

As of October 1919, Joe Cannon claimed that the last Democratic Congress had expended forty-five billion dollars,

> . . . more than the entire disbursements of the Federal Government from the first inauguration of George Washington to the second inauguration of Woodrow Wilson . . . greater than the entire wealth of the American people in the census year 1880 . . . double the gold production of the world in the 400 years since Columbus discovered this continent . . . one

> and one-half times the total resources of all the national banks. . . . The executive departments continue to estimate peace expenditures on a war basis just as though gold grew like mushrooms in the Treasury cellar and bank notes budded like leaves on the trees in springtime.[40]

The problem was traceable to the 1885 reform which distributed the appropriation process to the six major committees.[41] It was compounded by the 1910 insurgency which removed the Speaker as the single accountable individual. This diffusion of authority made the House vulnerable to special pleadings. In Cannon's view, government had become a special interest.[42] It secured some form of either executive or legislative legitimacy, promoted a demand for its services, secured a small appropriation for apparently innocuous activities, and then pointed triumphantly to the whole process as evidence that social justice demanded continuance and more money.[43]

The appropriations process was restored to the Appropriations Committee in 1921 and the Third Deficiency Bill (1919) carried a small amount of money for a "Bureau of Efficiency." By 1921 the entire revenue system of the United States was revised and had become essentially what it is today. While the budget preparation process has moved toward the President in direct proportion to the executive's initiation of legislation, the Congress has retained some checking power. Cannon warned in October 1919:

> If we leave any part of it [the budget] to the Executive we shall only exaggerate the present embarrassments. The electorate will continue to hold the Representatives responsible for the budget, whatever power they surrender to the Executive.[44]

The Republican Party continued to hammer this theme and the 1920 platform, controlled by standpatter Representative James E. Watson of Indiana, reflected antagonism to self-promoting, partisan bureaucracy.

> The administration has not demobilized the army of placeholders. It continued a method of financing which was indefensible. . . . It has used arbitrary and inquisitorial control over the life of the people . . . [to] carry confusion into industrial life.[45]

The platform was conservative by any standards. The progressive Wisconsin delegation's substitute did not even receive a second and the chairman had to call for order several times furing the reading. Party regularity and standpatting had been vindicated at the expense of the reformers. Cannon received a standing ovation as he ironically held a glass of water over his head and vowed to abide by the Prohibition Amendment.[46] He was eighty-four then and this was to be his last Republican convention. His first had seen the nomination of Abraham Lincoln.[47]

The 66th Congress, 1st Session

The heated issue of the Treaty of Versailles is sometimes cited as reason for convening the 66th Congress early in the special session of May 19, 1919.[48] The fiscal crisis occasioned by the failure of so many bills in the 65th Congress was equally important. Certainly though,

the peace and League issue was foremost in the nation's press. The Washington Post carried an editorial daily on one aspect or another of the controversial treaty. For years afterward, the bibliography of the American Historical Association would reflect the constitutional issue with articles on presidential and Senate responsibilities.[49]

One well known advocate, Colonel George Harvey, founded a new magazine to join the debate. Modestly titled The Weekly,[50] the first issue of March 1, 1919 carried an article entitled "No Gag Law." The reference, however, was to a larger issue than that in the House. Harvey castigated the President for his penchant for publicity and the effrontery of telling the Senate that they could not debate the still secret terms of the first draft: " . . . he was preparing to address the people directly, in the wildest possible manner; as if to appeal to them against their own representatives and lawmakers."[51] That is, of course, exactly what the President eventually attempted in his ill-fated western trip.

The die was cast in Congress, however, and the administration's major policies were doomed to frustration. The magazine World's Work published an obituary of the Democratic 65th Congress that was generally favorable, crediting them with useful legislation in labor law, income taxes, the direct election of Senators and the Federal

Reserve Law. The same issue heralded the return of "resurgent Cannonism." The Speaker was no longer commander of the House, ironically due to Democratic reforms in the rules. The power now lay in the Committee on Committees, seized by Cannon and Mann. "The lovers of political paradox could find no situation more productive of unholy joy."[52]

Republican progressives in the House were fooled, but they fought back under the leadership of Roosevelt's son-in-law, Nicholas Longworth of Ohio. The control of the Committee on Committees by Mann was publicly described as a triumph of reactionism. Longworth said the committee "represented only large cities and manufacturing centers, was made up of millionaires and did not represent agriculture, labor or a fair geographical distribution." This was the attitude which had made the Republicans a minority in the recent past, charged Longworth.[53] This pressure of the Ohio representative and about sixty other progressives had the effect of keeping the policy apparatus in the House loosely divided among the Steering Committee, the other major committees (such as Ways and Means and Appropriations) and the Committee on Committees.[54] This diffusion of authority had the effect of keeping secret the policy-making machinery.[55] Longworth had succeeded temporarily in his 1910 insurgency and his faction had to be dealt with in 1919. In fact, much later, he became

Speaker himself.[56] However, the test was in the 1920 Republican convention and he was neither a delegate nor a member of any important committees.[57] The platform and the candidate were not likely to warm a progressive's heart.

The Deficiency Appropriation Bill--Again

The bill came up again May 29, 1919. Congressman Good was the chairman of the Appropriations Committee in the new Congress and he set the theme of Republican fiscal policy in his management of the bill. He claimed huge savings in actual dollars as well as tightening of procedures. The major claims were in the War Department, Navy Department, and the Alaskan railroad. He also cut the USES to $272,000 from $1,800,000. That money would pay the debts of the USES and carry it to July 1, 1919. He reported the previous session's gag amendment and frankly admitted that it was subject to a point of order. "It is new legislation, but it will prohibit a practice that has been indulged in so often, without regard to what administration is in power."[58]

The question of riders on amendments on the appropriation bills was constantly recurring. In some cases, it was an issue of committee prerogative. Members objected to their legislative deliberations in committee being modified by action on the floor.[59] There could be no extensive debate on these amendments in the rush of

Speaker Hinkley.[38] However, his lead was in the 1900 Republican convention and he was neither a delegate nor a member of any important committee.[39] The platform and the candidate were not likely to warm a conservative's heart.

The Littlefield Investigation (1911--April

The bill came up again May 24, 1911. Committee hoped was the chairman or the appropriations Committee if the new Governor and he met the issues of Republican fiscal policy in his management of the bill. He claimed $1000 surplus in annual dollars we will be liabilities of con- centures. The major claims were in the War Department, navy Department, and the Pension Bureau. In 1911 the pay the fiscal of the $1000 and county it be July 1, 1910. Be received the previous session's pay warrants and Finally pointed that it was entirely to a point of order. "It is new legislation, but it will economize a thousand that has been included in an item, without reward to your administration is in power."[41]

The question of right on amendments on the appropriation bills was constantly questioned. In 1909 Cannon, it was an issue of committee prerogative. Democrats objected to their legislative definitions in committee being modified by motions on the floor.[42] There would be no extensive debate on floor amendments in the event of

legislation. Also, there was an implicit relationship with the executive agencies which the various representatives were bound to defend. It was bad business procedure as well as bad politics.

Conversely, the political situation was tempting. Time was short for the executive and the government could very well be bankrupt on June 30 if appropriation bills were not signed. Substantive issues referred to committee could be effectively delayed by Democratic minorities. Appropriation bills always had priority on the floor of the House and could be called up on short notice before an empty chamber. The majority had many advantages on any issue which could command either party loyalty or commend itself in principle. Republicans controlled the chair, who would rule on any point of order raised by the opposition. If the chair's ruling was challenged, the House would resolve it by simple majority vote. Democratic opposition on the floor to publicly supported issues would result in good publicity for the Republican cause. Given a consensus against the use of appropriations for publicity purposes, the natural jealousy of the House concerning revenue measures, the national antipathy to George Creel and his fellow publicists, and the need for speed in the appropriations process, it is not surprising that the measure never went to the Judiciary Committee.[60]

Congressman Blanton coutinued his battle against

the USES. He attempted the strategy of striking the reduced appropriation. This failed and he raised the point of order. Representative Good tried rather patiently to assure him that the reduced appropriation was in the interest of good business only. The appropriation did not contemplate legitimizing the USES in any way. The chair (J. Hampton Moore, Republican-Pennsylvania) turned Good's argument upon him and ruled in the most narrow sense that no law provided for the USES; therefore the point of order was sustained. The money was later restored in the Senate-House conference,[61] but it required no genius of insight to foresee that there would be no legislatively approved federal role in employment from the 66th Congress.

One issue remained in the floor debate. It had been raised by Representative Smith earlier and now he offered an amendment to the paragraph, inserting the words "in the discharge of their official duties" after the words "United States."[62] Good, the sponsor of the bill and the original amendment, made no objection. Good saw no real difference in the language. Smith then said:

> I think the amendment I offer is necessary in order to explain the provision. Otherwise the employees might be held to be violating the penal section if they should communicate with their Members of Congress <u>except</u> through official channels.[63]

He further insisted that the amendment be adopted or the word "employees" dropped.

Finis J. Garrett (Democrat-Tennessee) defended the

original language. He pointed out that the Smith language would restrict the official in the actual performance of his duty since communicating was a major function and indeed a responsibility of any official. He concluded his argument by citing a hearsay case in which a federal judge had issued an injunction against a government official, enjoining him not to communicate any information to Congress.[64]

Smith was not satisfied and he continued to insist upon the federal employee's right to communicate with his congressman:

> Do you want to apply military rules to civil employees of the Government and provide that they shall have to communicate with Congressmen through their superior officers . . . Employees have no official function to perform in communicating with Congress. I think to prohibit communications from employees except through official channels is un-American.[65]

Another representative tried a new tack with Smith. He took the simple view that the provision merely meant the use of public funds. "I take it that it simply prohibits employees or officials of the Government from using public funds in communicating to Congress." All communications from public employees involving public funds should be through official channels.[66]

Smith was having his own communication problems so he tried again. He drew the distinction between the officer and the employee. The officer should be held to a restricted communication only within the competence of his

official duties. An employee could not be so held. Any officer's communications should be through channels and official. But the effect on employees would be to dissuade them from "expressing their opinions about the conduct of public business."[67] He insisted he favored the provision and sought the clarifying language to "protect employees of the Government in their right to express their opinions concerning legislation and the conduct of the public business without securing the consent of some bureau officer to do so."[68] The record does not indicate how well the members followed the sophisticated argument, but Smith's amendment was rejected and what has become known as the gag law passed onto the statute book.

The bill moved on to the Senate and conference action. The Senate added the language "on the request of Members of Congress" and "proper" to the words "official channels." The Congress, having accepted the proposition that the lobbying of executive officers had to be proscribed explicitly, was faced with reducing the law to specific language.

A Type of Freedom Entirely New

This discussion has dealt heavily with the procedural issues. Because those issues are the only ones upon which the individuals in Congress could probably agree, they are important. The Wilson Administration had demonstrated tendencies which promised a redefinition and

a realignment of executive-legislative relations. Beginning with Wilson's "acid test" call for a sympathetic Congress on the eve of the 1918 elections[69] to his specific exclusion of the Senate from the treaty negotiations at Versailles, the executive aggrandizement of power was a threat Congress could not ignore. The charges of autocrat were not entirely hyperbole.[70]

George Creel's activities in domestic labor relations portended a kind of special interest representation in the executive which could bring irresistible pressure on any recalcitrant congressman. Coupled with the hortatory pens of the CPI's writers, there was a potential for an unprecedented combination of information, administration and, eventually, legislation.

John B. Densmore's activities in San Francisco demonstrated the administration's attitudes toward local and state legal procedure. Were the Department of Labor to complete the link by the establishment of a national employment service, the grip of the executive on the nation's economy would be complete.

Roger Babson's program of centralized record-keeping on the individual worker was a high-water mark of the managerial revolution's presumptions. Some would call it Taylorism, others Socialism, and still others Prussianization. Whatever it was called, it must have seemed either eccentric or mad to congressmen with bucolic, Jeffersonian

ideals. Veterans of the Ainsworth-Wood muster roll controversy knew the importance of the control of records and information centers.[71]

The same sort of perspective has to be applied to the War Department's General Staff. The Congress was not prepared to continue a large standing army, a centralized general staff, or universal military training. The conditions which had created these institutions no longer existed. What is more, the assumptions which had led to their initial creation had been substantially discredited. The attacks upon military discipline were a warning to any militarist with political ambitions, including John J. Pershing and Leonard Wood (who was not so much a militarist as a progressive opportunist). That this policy worked so well is illustrated by the following passage in Frank B. Willis's nominating speech for Warren G. Harding at the 1920 Republican convention:

> . . . as a member of the Senate it was his honor and privilege to introduce into the Senate of the United States and to secure the passage of the legislation that provided for the Roosevelt Division for service in France [applause] legislation that was greatly welcomed by patriotic people, but it was not availed of because of an executive partisan bigotry absolutely without parallel in all the annals of war. [Applause, loud and prolonged.][72]

This statement drew the loudest and longest applause of the speech. The Roosevelt Division represented voluntarism, amateurism, and the romantic tradition that had been rejected by the Selective Service Act, the

"Leavenworth clique," and the Espionage and Sedition laws. The image of Theodore Roosevelt leading an infantry assault in Argonne or St. Mihiel may be ludicrous at this remove but it was not in 1920.

The substantive issues were crucial and they loomed large. There was a minor depression, as expected, in 1919, and a larger one in 1920-1921.[73] One writer has called 1919 the "Year of the Strike."[74] The Gimbel's bombings occurred in June, and the first "Red raids" and deportations occurred shortly thereafter. These social dislocations, injustices, and depressions were nothing new to a generation which had been conceived in the Civil war and come to maturity in its aftermath.[75]

The insistence of the Congress upon restoring the procedural process was not mere complacency. It was based upon an old and revered concept of representation:

> His concern [the representative's] is to prevent action based on factious interest. . . . Madison envisages representation as a way of bringing dangerous social conflict into a single central forum, where it can be controlled by balancing and stalemating. . . . Only if each representative pursues the factious interests of his constituency can the various factious interests in the nation balance each other off in the government.[76]

The Wilson Administration had become too big and too powerful. The lofty rhetoric which was imitated through the multiple layers of the bureaucracy was merely ideological camouflage for a will to power.[77] The government functionaries had become their own special interests,

representing themselves and new groups. One of their victims, Morris Hillquit, from an entirely different point of the political spectrum occupied by Harding and Cannon, described the situation in a mock interview on October 3, 1920:

> And have they [the Wilson Administration] introduced the promised new freedom into America?
>
> Chief Editor of a Conservative Daily: Indeed, they have inaugurated a type of freedom entirely new in America, not the old-fashioned vulgar freedom of the rabble, but the freedom of administration officials from all constitutional restraints and from stultifying responsibility to the people.[78]

CHAPTER IV FOOTNOTES

[1]Dixon Wecter, When Johnny Comes Marching Home (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1944), p. 356.

[2]George R. Brown, The Leadership of Congress (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1922), p. 261.

[3]Ibid., pp. 272-279.

[4]George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1958), p. 86.

[5]17 Republican National Convention, Proceedings (New York: Tenny Press, 1920), June 8-12, 1920.

[6]Chicago Tribune, Mar. 1, 1919, p. 6; New York Times, Mar. 1, p. 1; Mar. 4, p. 1; Mar. 5, p. 1 (Wilson attack on Congress).

[7]House Journal, 66th Cong., 1st sess.

[8]Brown, p. 202. "Caucus" was a discredited word so "conference" was substituted.

[9]Washington Post, Feb. 28, 1919, p. 1.

[10]Brown, p. 208.

[11]Ibid., p. 211-220; Washington Post, Mar. 2, 1919, p. 4. This meant that Mann controlled 144 of 238 possible votes in the Committee. It was the Democratic 65th Cong. which adopted this rule. Previously members were appointed by the Speaker and minority leader respectively.

[12]Brown, pp. 205-206.

[13]Ibid., p. 162.

[14]Ibid., p. 170.

[15]H. W. Fowler, A Dictionary of Modern English Usage, (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 80.

[16]Blair Bolles, Tyrant From Illinois (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1951), p. 130.

[17]Ibid., p. 138.

[1] Olson, Bryant, Then Johnny Comes Marching Home (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911), p. 376.

[2] George E. Brown, The Leadership of Congress (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1914), p. 203.

[3] Ibid., pp. 211-212.

[4] George T. Bowdy, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1931), p. 60.

[5] 12 Congressional Record Convention, Proceedings (New York: Lamar Press, 1920), June 8-12, 1920.

[6] Chicago Tribune, Mar. 3, 1911, p. 8; New York Times, Mar. 1, p. 12; Mar. 4, p. 11; Mar. 6, p. 1 (these articles are conferences).

[7] House Journal, 80th Cong., 1st sess.

[8] Green, p. 202. "Caucus" was a clarified word so "conference" was substituted.

[9] Washington Post, Feb. 12, 1932, p. 1.

[10] Brown, p. 109.

[11] Ibid., p. 121-124; Washington Post, Mar. 5, 1919, p. 1. This result that there could be 219 possible votes in the Committee. It was the Democratic 65th Cong. which elected this vote. Previously members were appointed by the Speaker and majority leader respectively.

[12] Brown, pp. 203-206.

[13] Ibid., p. 162.

[14] Ibid., p. 176.

[15] R. Fowler, A Dictionary of Modern English Usage, (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 80.

[16] Blair Bolles, Tyrant From Illinois (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1951), p. 120.

[17] Ibid., p. 136.

[18]Mowry, p. 128, 223-224.

[19]Brown, pp. 172-186.

[20]Bolles, p. 139.

[21]Ibid., p. 225. Cannon's perspective might have been affected by the fact that his two election losses were to a Populist (1890) and a Progressive (1912).

[22]Brown, p. 98.

[23]House Document No. 264, p. 15.

[24]Ibid., p. 27.

[25]Brown, p. 16.

[26]Seward Livermore, Politics Is Adjourned (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1966), p. 217.

[27]41 U.S. Stat. 35, Alien Property Custodian; 41 U.S. Stat 42, Emergency Shipping Fund, etc.

[28]Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 620.

[29]Congressional Record, Feb. 28, 1919, p. 4624.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Ibid., p. 4625.

[32]Ibid.

[33]James R. Mock and Evangeline Thurber, Report on Demobilization (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1944), pp. 208-210.

[34]Congressional Record, Feb. 28, 1919, p. 4626.

[35]Ibid., p. 4627.

[36]Washington Post, Mar. 1, 1919, p. 3.

[37]Industry, Mar. 1, 1919, p. 1.

[38]World's Work, Mar. 1919, p. 497.

[39]House Document No. 247, p. 4.

[16]Howry, p. 128, 222n-223n.

[17]Brown, pp. 172-184.

[18]Bullock, p. 217.

[19]Ibid., p. 222. Crumpin [perhaps] might have been
affected by the fact that its two director towns were in a
Populist (1890) and a Progressive (1913).

[20]Brown, p. 92.

[21]Texas Democrat 30, 1914, p. 12.

[22]1914, p. 27.

[23]Brown, p. 16.

[24]Howard Peterson, Politics in Edinburg (Mastersthesis,
Canyon: Westtexas University Press, 1957), p. 217.

[25]41 U.S. 1842, 25, Atlee Pomperoy Constellation, 11 L.E.
Stat 42, Uncertainty Shipping Trust, etc.

[26]Roy Seamond Nabby, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters,
(New York: Crossword Press, 1963), p. 610.

[27]Congressional Record, Feb. 28, 1918, p. 8124.

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Homophilipation (Dayton: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964),
pp. 109-121.

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[33]1918., p. 4017.

[34]Washington Post, Mar. 1, 1918, p. 3.

[35]Indiana, Mar. 1, 1918, p. 1.

[36]World's Work, Mar. 1918, p. 447.

[37]Idaho Democrat Mo. 347, p. 4.

[40]Ibid., p. 5.

[41]Ibid.,

[42]Ibid.

[43]Ibid., p. 24. Cannon cited the Department of Agriculture budget increase from $250,000 in 1881 to $70 million in 1919. Also, the fledgling Public Health Service promoted a $3 million appropriation on the sensationalism of doughboy V.D.

[44]Ibid., p. 28.

[45]17th Republican National Convention, Proceedings, p. 94.

[46]Ibid., p. 89.

[47]Bolles, p. 46.

[48]By waiting until May to call the session, the same time negotiations were theoretically being finalized, the linkage of the treaty and the session were a face-saver.

[49]Bibliography, American Historical Association (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1919-1926).

[50]George Harvey, The Weekly, Mar. 1, 1919. Harvey changed the title to Harvey's Weekly with the succeeding issue of Mar. 8, 1919. He explained the simpler title had caused great confusion with distributers.

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[52]World's Work, April 1919, p. 613.

[53]Washington Post, Mar. 14, 1919, p. 4.

[54]Brown, p. 219.

[55]Ibid.

[56]John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), p. 239.

[57]17th Republican National Convention, Proceedings.

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[49] Ibid., p. 5.

[48] Ibid.,

[47] Ibid.,

[46] Ibid., p. 14. Leaves stood the Superintendent of Agricultural Output increases from $110,000 in 1921 to $70 million in 1929. Like, the Weighing Problem Service promoted a $3 million appropriation on the Transitionalism of Longley's.

[45] Ibid., p. 19.

[44] 11th Legislative Retinal Convention, Proceedings, p. 94.

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[41] By waiting until they re call the session, the wage claim negotiations were theoretically being finalized, the hiatus of the treaty and the session were a face-saver.

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[37] World's Work, April 1919, p. 613.

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[33] Joba D. Hicks, Populistic Revolutionary (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), p. 117.

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[30] Ibid., p. 903.

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[61]Ibid., June 19, 1919, p. 1394, 2074; House Report No. 97.

[62]Ibid., May 29, 1919, p. 425.

[63]Ibid.

[64]Ibid.

[65]Ibid.

[66]Ibid., p. 426.

[67]Ibid.

[68]Ibid.

[69]Livermore, p. 217.

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[71]Elting E. Morison, Men Machines and Modern Times (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), pp. 49-50.

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[78]Morris Hillquit Mss., Wisconsin State Historical Society, address at Delmonico Club, October 3, 1920, Box 6, folder 6. It will be remembered that Hillquit, 1918 Socialist candidate for mayor of New York, was an organizer of the Council for Democracy and the Terms of Peace--the target of the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy.

CHAPTER V

THE LAW IS RETAINED

Overview

The law passed in 1919 involved elements of partisan politics, federal fiscal policy, and institutional integrity. Conservative Republicans were taking the first tentative steps toward a long period of ascendancy. An integral part of that ascendancy was a return--however incomplete--to a smaller executive role in the economy and the society. Most importantly, the House of Representatives was reasserting its role in the determination of national policy.

The specific law signed July 11, 1919 has changed in the intervening years; but, of course, so has the society. The fiscal comparison is almost meaningless in a context whereby the annual deficit is equal to the total expenditure for the "Great War." The legislative-executive relationship has undergone the most radical change. The New Deal fractured forever the Republican archetypes of Joseph Cannon and James R. Mann. However, partisan politics remain and few issues are so hotly debated as that of government propaganda.

Predictably, the attempts at implementation of the law have occurred in those circumstances of hostile

CHAPTER V

THE LAW IS ENACTED

Overview

The law passed in 1919 involved elements of partisan politics, federal fiscal policy, and institutional inadequacy. Conservative Republicans were backing the first tentative steps toward a long period of suppression. An internal split of that dominance was a reform-oriented insurgency--so a smaller executive role in the economy and the society. Most importantly, the forces of representative rule prevailed in the determination of national policy.

The specific law entered July 11, 1919 was changed in the intervening years, of course, to the best-ever. The final composition is almost unrecognizable in a context whereby the annual deficit is equal to the total expenditure for the "usual use." The legislative-executive relationship has undergone the most radical change. The Chief Executive now enjoys the legislative prerogatives of Joseph Cannon and James G. Blaine. Congress, politics politics remain, and the issues are no small element as that of governmental prerogatives.

Inevitably, the attempts at implementation of the laws occurred in whose circumstances of hostile

legislators bridling at executive promotions of programs.

The law became an issue of controversy in 1933 during the debate over the Copeland Food and Drug Bill:

> In this case the Food and Drug Administration dampened its campaign for the Copeland Bill and took greater caution about its publicity in general, in spite of the fact that it was authorized in its own appropriation act to illustrate the results of its work. Other agencies as well have followed a policy of caution when this law might be invoked, though in no case has the "gag" law ever been enforced in the extreme interpretation which might be given to it. Obviously, an extreme interpretation would forbid the distribution to congressmen of much of the literature published by administrative agencies.[1]

The issue arose during hearings by the House Publicity and Propaganda Subcommittee in its investigation of the activities of the Federal Security Agency, War Department, in 1947-1948. This investigation of publicity activities in support of universal military training charged the War Department with engaging in "activities calculated to build up a federally stimulated public demand upon Congress for enactment of legislation for universal military training." Committee questioning referenced possible violations of Title 18, U.S.C. by members of the War Department.[2]

The 1919 themes are evident in the Congress's actions through today. Although "legitimate" information activity is accepted, aggressive programs in support of proposed legislation such as the Copeland Bill fall within the proscribed area. The tendency of Congress is to be extremely specific in the allocation of appropriations. For example, Public Law 89-555 of September 6, 1966

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For example, Public Law 89-521 of September 6, 1966

(Independent Offices Appropriations Act, 1967) specifically restricted personnel and administrative staffs to a ratio of 1:35, limited all research projects to the exact funding of the project itself, and prohibited holding funds over to the succeeding fiscal year. These qualifications followed the section which generally forbade publicity or propaganda. The Congress expressed disfavor with expanding the public relations functions of the independent offices. They followed that with limitations upon the personnel staffs, limited the fact-finding function, and provided advance notice that the funds would be retracted eventually.[3]

It is beyond the present scope to examine the historical circumstances of each legislative-executive conflict. It is not inappropriate to return to a procedural issue, specifically the revision of 41 U.S. Stat. 68 (1919).

That revision illustrates several principles of the legislative-executive relation. Firstly, the law has been retained despite its lack of use. Secondly, revision of the law by the legislative branch has added the word "lobbying," a word and description which was carefully avoided in 1919. Thirdly, the law has been popularly designated the gag law, a word not only avoided in 1919, but specifically denounced as being un-American.

The law remains an explicit restriction of

executive relations with constituents. It includes a threat, fine and removal for violation of that relation. In practice it is less a threat to the politician than the bureaucrat. That is, any prosecution would occur through the offices of the Attorney General, a pplitical appointee naturally less inclined to pursue malefactors of his own administration than those of the previous one.

When passed, the law put the George Creels and the John Densmores on notice that while they might well secure civil service appointments, they were subject to speedy removal by the designated superior officer. Pursued far enough through the bureaucracy, a politically appointed officer would ultimately be reached. This accounts for Densmore's low spirits when he wrote to Creel March 21, 1919, after Congress had adjourned without funding the United States Employment Service (USES). "I shall endeavor to raise funds, privately, to carry on a public information bureau in Washington, which will without charge give disinterested information on Government activities."[4]

Revision

There is a significant difference in the current condition of the three restrictive laws of 1913-1919. The 1913 rider concerning the hiring of publicity experts became 5 U.S.C. 3107 (1970). Title 5 is concerned with general provisions for the organization and administration

of the executive agencies and departments. The amendment to the "Sundry" Bill of March 1, 1919 was translated into 44 U.S.C. 501 (1970) concerning regulations for the operation of the Government Printing Office. These are fundamentally administrative limitations and guidance for the efficient conduct of the government's business.[5]

The gag law, 41 U.S. Stat. 68, was translated into the criminal statutes. Violation of 18 U.S.C. 1913 carries a penalty of $500 fine, one year imprisonment and removal--a misdemeanor offense, but an offense nonetheless.

In 1926, the Congress initiated a general review and revision of the statutes at large and the revised statutes at large. The intent was to codify, revise, and discard the great body of laws accumulated during the history of the Republic. The work has continued to this date, with new editions of the U.S. Code being published every six years or so since 1926.[6]

The gag law remained 41 U.S. Stat. 68 until the first revision of the criminal statutes in the 1940 edition of the U.S. Code. In that edition, the gag law became 18 U.S.C. 201. There was little revision of the actual law at that time.[7]

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1943 abolished the House Committee on Revision of the Laws and assigned responsibility for subsequent review of the criminal statutes to the House Judiciary Committee.[8]

Subcommittee Number One of that committee introduced a bill, H.R. 2200, into the 79th Congress which would revise the 1940 Title 18. Congress adjourned before the bill could be enacted or heard.

Finally, on March 7, 1947, the newly convened 80th Congress, Subcommittee for Revision of Titles 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedure) and 28, (Judicial Organization) opened hearings on H.R. 1600, "a bill to revise, codify and enact into positive law Title 18." It was substantially the same bill introduced into the 79th Congress, 472 pages long, and the first witness was the former chairman of the subcommittee, Eugene J. Keogh, Representative of the 9th Congressional District, New York. However, the actual revision of Title 18 was not done by the subcommittee.

The House commissioned the West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minnesota, to write Titles 18 and 28. The publishing company hired W. W. Barron, formerly Chief, Appellate Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, to oversee the project.[9] As the company completed drafts of recommended revisions, they were forwarded to eminent lawyers and judges for comment. The entire legal world was interested in this work since there had been no substantial review of the criminal statutes since 1909. The revision received a thorough review before it became H.R. 1600. The Supreme Court was interested enough to

appoint a committee consisting of Justices Stone, Douglas, and Frankfurter to review the crucial Titles 18 and 28.[10]

The intent of Congress was to remove the statutes from the status of "prima facie" and to enact into "positive law". In the words of Mr. Keogh, it would "provide a permanent framework around which all future new or amendatory legislation can be enacted."[11] Those testifying before the committee pleaded that the bill not become an issue of politics. They feared the huge bill (472 pages) would be so marked up as to defeat the intent and nullify the work devoted to it. Mr. Keogh said, "We have sought to avoid as far as possible any substantive changes that did not meet with unanimity of opinion."[12]

The legislation, H.R. 1600, was enacted June 25, 1948; Chapter 645, 62 Stat. 792.[13] Section 1913 is the provision for the gag law and it is titled "Lobbying with Appropriated Moneys." The reviser's notes indicate that the words "department" and "agency" were added in three instances after "United States." This was done to eliminate doubt as to the scope of the section. Words "on conviction thereof" were eliminated as being surplus and reference to the offense as a misdemeanor was eliminated as being redundant.

There have been no convictions under the law, as 41 U.S. Stat. 68 (1919), 18 U.S.C. 201 (1940), or 18 U.S.C. 1913 (1948). The law is cited in a footnote to Angilly v.

U.S.[14] The note uses the section to uphold "The fact that cause for dismissal embraces conduct which is also criminal does not render a proceeding a criminal action." The case involved a suit by an employee of the Bureau of Naturalization alleging violation of due process in his dismissal for politically related activities.

Despite the fact that there have been no convictions under the law, it would seem premature to declare it a dead issue. The Congress and the judiciary--to include three members of the Supreme Court--have given the matter cursory attention at least.[15]

Lobbying

It was in 1940 that the title "Lobbying with Appropriated Moneys"[16] was added to the law. Like the gag term, "lobbying" was not explicitly used in the original construction of the amendment. This very likely was due to a 1913 exercise in legislative futility--the Overman investigation.[17]

Shortly after his 1913 inauguration (April), President Wilson called a special session of Congress to fulfil Democratic pledges for tariff revision downward. The session convened and very few days afterward, Representative Oscar W. Underwood (Democrat-Alabama) introduced a bill calling for reduction on 958 items. The bill went through the House in short order; but it ran into difficulty in the less disciplined Senate.[18]

c.s.[36] The code were the methods to explain "the rare that case for directed endeavors contact which is also optional does work result a processing a critical action." the case involved a suit by an employee or the heiress of fraternalistic eligible violation of dues process in its dismissal for politically related activities.

Despite the fact that there have been no convictions under the law, it would seem premature to declare it a dead issue. The Congress and the judiciary--to individuals members of the Supreme Court--must give the matter extremely attention as least.[37]

Addendum

It was in 1941 that the title "Lobbying with appropriated Money" was added to the law. Like the word term, "lobbyist" was not originally used in the original construction of the amendment. It was only likely was the in a 1913 exercise in legislative futility--the Congress increased.[37]

Shortly after the 1913 inauguration (April), Congress to Profit Corporation clothing for Social reliable Movement. The motion occurred and their the laws affirmed, representatives under by Vocational Independent-Business) legislature a bill modified for reduction on 913 taxes. The bill went through rose House in short period but it was lost difficulty in the laws disapplied Senate.[38]

President Wilson retaliated by denouncing special interest lobbyists in a press release of May 27, 1913. "There is every evidence that money without limit is being spent to sustain this lobby, and to create an appearance of a pressure of public opinion antagonistic to some of the chief items of the tariff bill."[19]

The Senate acted quickly. Senator Albert B. Cummins (Republican-Iowa) introduced a resolution[20] which was referred to a subcommittee chaired by Senator Lee Overman (Democrat-North Carolina). The major questions to be resolved were the tariff-special interest issues developed during the preceding years. At last it seemed the campaigns of the muchrakers had broken the Congress's wall of rule-enforced silence.

The general charges are familiar. The standpatters had prevented legislation which would have lowered prices and generally improved the conditions of the lower classes. The special interests had repaid the obstructionists with political favors and, some suspected, actual bribes.

One month later, the New York World and the Chicago Tribune[21] added fuel to the fire by beginning publication of the intimate revelations of a discharged National Association of Manufacturers lobbyist, Martin M. Mulhall.[22] The documents implicated former President William H. Taft, his Vice President, James S. Sherman, five senators, and seven representatives as having received favors from the

National Association of Manufacturers. Mulhall had lobbied for manufacturers through their affiliates: the National Council for Industrial Defense, the National Tariff Commission Association, and the Workingmen's Protective Association (an open shop organization).[23]

The House proceeded upon its own investigation with a select committee chaired by Finis J. Garrett (Democrat-Tennessee).[24] The House was principally concerned with the charges against its members and ultimately absolved all but one--James McDermott, an organization Democrat from Chicago. He allegedly received money from District of Columbia liquor dealers and pawn brokers, and sabotaged labor legislation.[25] He resigned to avoid censure and was promptly reelected to the 64th Congress from the same district.[26]

The Senate attempted to frame legislation to regulate lobbying. The hearings continued well into 1914. Two bills were introduced in the 64th Congress. The first[27] essayed to define lobbying and set standards for punishment. It was referred to the Committee on Elections and Privileges where it died. The second[28] was to frame language prohibiting lobbying and it too died in committee. Periodic efforts were made to revive the issue,[29] but by 2d Session, 64th Congress, "lobbying" had disappeared from the Congressional Record Index.

The length and sensationalism of the investigation

militated against any effective legislation. Both parties became involved and no real charges could be sustained against men like Cannon. There were only fifteen letters[30] to or from the former Speaker and none substantiated impropriety. Congressman James W. Good, who proposed the gag amendment, was actually identified as a friend of labor by the NAM.[31] The lobbying of the AFL was exposed as substantially as that of the NAM.[32] The effort to link the "special interests" became increasingly silly as it developed that the NAM had actually attempted to persuade Cannon to moderate his protectionist stance in 1908.[33] James Van Cleave, NAM President, had gone to the convention with a proposal to create an independent tariff commission. Cannon: ". . . no more trusted business men to determine what was good for themselves than he trusted his colleagues in Congress to determine what was good for the people they represented."[34]

It had been a bruising controversy, although nothing really came of it except a few tarnished reputations. As the Chicago Tribune commended, it was "a case of the mountain laboring and bringing forth a little ridiculous mouse."[35] To the tough old standpatters, the brouhaha raised by the Progressives and Democrats alike was merely an exercise in hypocrisy. "Special interests" indeed,--that is the only kind of interest there is, and it is the duty of the representative to represent them. "The national

interest is the sum of the objective interests that compose the nation, when these are correctly determined through rational deliberation."[36] It is the representative's duty to avoid the transitory passions of the moment and discover the objective interest. If he fails to do so, he is simply turned out at the next election--as Edmund Burke was after the "Address to the Electors of Bristol"[37] and Cannon was in 1912.

Institutional Gags

The Congress never referred to 41 U.S. Stat. 68 as a gag law. On two occasions of the general debate, February 13 and February 28, 1919, Representatives on the floor referred to gag as prior restraint and un-American. This problem bothered Representative Smith as he struggled with the wording of the amendment.

Older, cynical men such as Mann and Cannon had no problem with the substantive issue. What was being done might impinge upon the personal liberties of individual officials, and it might even be completely unworkable. But over the long sweep of history, especially the history of institutions, a proscription of this kind was not unprecedented.

The word gag is related to the procedures used in the British House of Commons whereby debate is cut short in spite of the wish of a minority to continue. As in the

[illegible] in the use of the adjective [illegible] that occurs
the written, when there are commonly established [illegible]
national definitions.[1] It is the responsibility [illegible]
to avoid the terminology questions of the country that diffe-
rences the definitions internally. If the facts is to be met, the
is adopted instead and at the most elementary--or [illegible] there
may arise the "problems to the [illegible] of [illegible]." was
Census was in 1910.

[illegible]

The Constitution never referred to At [illegible] year. It
is a day law. In the conditions of the general [illegible]
Tuesday 1) and February 7th,[illegible] [illegible]ments on the
floor referred to day as after [illegible] and [illegible].
This practice [illegible] [illegible] which is the attempted
with the meeting of the [illegible].

Clear, [illegible] the with as [illegible] [illegible] but no
practice with the [illegible] time. That may being down
slight [illegible] upon the [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible]
officials, and it might even be [illegible] [illegible].
But over [illegible] many of [illegible], especially the History
of [illegible], a [illegible] of this kind [illegible] not
[illegible].

The [illegible] is related to the [illegible] used in
the [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] is not [illegible]
to [illegible] or the [illegible] of a [illegible] to [illegible]. In [illegible]

American House, the closure is brought into operation by a motion "that the question be now put." The "guillotine" is a related word which describes the limitation of time. The "kangaroo" is a further development wherein the "Chairman of committees is empowered to select the amendments that shall be debated, the unselected ones being voted on without debate."[38] The minority, or injured party, uses gag to describe the procedure.

There was even an American precedent for institutional gagging. During the years 1836-1844, the House of Representatives biennially reenacted a rule which prevented the presentation of abolitionist petitions on the floor.[39] It was the cork upon legislative resolution of the slavery issue. John Quincey Adams fought the rule tenaciously in the House.[40] The persistence in defense of the right of petition earned him the sobriquet "Old Man Eloquent."[41] The House established a special committee (Chairman, Henry L. Pinckney, South Carolina) which decreed that all petitions dealing with slavery should be "laid upon the table."[42] John C. Calhoun led the proponents of the many gag rules and resolutions, holding to the theory that the federal government was bound to resist attempts to make it (the government) the instrument of attacks on sectional domestic differences. The resolution was rescinded.December 3, 1844 on the motion of John Quincy Adams, when northern Democratic support for the

issue of gagging waned.[43] The attitudes of Adams would be recognizable in 1919. He opposed the politicaans' traditional scramble for the spoils of office and maintained that " ! . . the nation needed a permanent body of trained and competent public servants, ennoying tenure of office during good behavior. In short, he looked upon the national government as an agency for economic, intellectual and moral improvemnnt."[44]

The ironies abound. It was the Democratic 65th Congress which first adopted the cloture rule on March 8, 1917 permitting a simple majority to terminate debate. The first successful invocation of cloture was in 1919, during the Versailles Treaty debate.[45] The effect was to exacerbate the divisions in the Senate, harden the positions of the opposing sides, and ensure the final failure of Senate ratification.[46]

41 U.S. Stat. 68 (1919) and 18 U.S.C. 1913 (1970) Compared

Other than the addition of the title, the law is remarkably similar today to what was finally adopted in 1919. The first element is the use of moneys appropriated by Congress. The second is communications intended to influence a congressman's decision. These two elements are modified by the specifications that communications are authorized when requested by Congress or when they are necessary for the efficient conduct of the public business.

[illegible] issue of [illegible] voted.[63] The attitude of Adams would be responsible in 1919. He opposed the politicians' traditional reasons for the repeal of office and maintained that " . . . the nation needed a permanent body of trained and competent public servants, employment of office during good behavior. In short, he looked upon the railroad controversy as an enemy for economic, individual and moral improvement."[64]

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[illegible] U.S. Stat. 45 (1919) and 13 U.S.C. 1917 (1919) Compared

Other than the addition of the title, the law is remarkably similar today to what was finally adopted in 1913. The first element is the rule of majority stipulated by Congress. The second is [illegible] intended to influence a contractman's decision. These two elements are modified by the specifications that [illegible] are sufficient when required by Congress or when they are necessary for the efficient [illegible] of the public business.

The punishment remains--specifically removal, fine, and misdemeanor imprisonment. The sequence of the language has been reversed with no real effect other than emphasis. The 1919 law first stipulated removal following a hearing, then provided the misdemeanor penalties. The current law positively states the penalty and then prescribes the hearing and removal.

Both versions of the law have in common an improbable sequence of events. The first element is the clearest of all, as it was in 1919. That is the use of public funds. With the continuing revision of the budgetary process begun in 1921 and the creation of the General Accounting Office, there is reason to expect a better accounting of public money. George Creel could not fund the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy without congressional knowledge today.

The second element of the offense, concerning the intent of communications, is the weakest part of the law. Proof of "intent" must be very clear in a criminal proceeding. Here the law comes closest to the issues of free speech and the right to petition. Had the War Department been able to establish the use of any government material in the letters to Congressman Gallivan, the government would have had a very good case. The intent of the letters was certainly to influence pending legislation.

The 1948 revision which added the words "department" and "agency" raises the principal problem of the law's application. Congressman Addison T. Smith had foreseen that debate, he strenuously insisted that the amendment was inadequate. He drew a precise difference between the civil servant's function as an officer and as an employee. The former person, position, or function was strictly official in nature. Under that construction, any communication to Congress was bound by the competence of the official. But the latter, the employee in his general role as a citizen, was not bound in any communication to Congress. Smith envisioned the future problem.

The revisers were faced with a spectacular increase in the numbers of federal civil servants--not including the military and postal service. Unable to define where the duties as an official ended and those as a citizen began, the revisers broadened the scope to recognize the growth of the executive branch. The addition of the words "department" and "agency" meant that very few people on the federal payroll were not included. The construction of the law still favors "official channels."

The Congress is always alert to possible violations of principle and statute, although the legislative branch still has not satisfactorily illuminated the information-propaganda dilemma. As late as 1947, a

committee report specifically censured the War Department.

> The use of federal funds for the purpose of influencing legislation before Congress is unlawful under section 201, Title 18 of the U.S. Code. We have, therefore, brought these matters [UMT lobbying] to the attention of the Department of Justice. . . .

That committee of the Republican 80th Congress was hostile to the Democratic president. As in 1919, a world war had just ended and the United States was embroiled in international controversies. The agitation for a system of universal military training was inextricably linked to the draft. The miscreants in the War Department were far down the hierarchy, struggling with the information aspects of a tentative administration program. Unlike the situation in 1919, the committee offered a definition in the same report:

> Information: The act or process of communicating knowledge, to enlighten.
> Propaganda: A plan for the propagation of a doctrine or a system of principles.
> . . . It is the authority and the supposed objectivity of Government which leads people to accept, without question, the words released by Government officials and agencies.[47]

The Reaction Point

It is in the coincidence of abuses in one or all of the three functional areas of administration, appropriations, and information that congressional reaction is elicited. The political appointee of the administration is free to exchange almost any kind of information in almost any forum. When he uses congressionally appropriated

funds specified for another purpose, it is a violation. Creel's words were no real threat; but his place in the administration and his use of his committee's funds were. Densmore occupied a position considerably below that of cabinet members and heads of special agencies. But his place at the central point of a government-funded, labor-organized, national employment service was a threat indeed. His administration of the proposed system could create the information necessary to control the appropriations. If General March and the General Staff were permitted to control all information of the War Department's current activities, only the glowing accounts of the AEF would be released. The implications of that even had a bearing on the biggest single prize of all, the presidential election of 1920.

The problem is not simply the use of appropriations. That is perhaps the most easily determined issue. Nor is the problem simply the difference in information and propaganda. There is a constant deluge of government communications which would be enobled by the term propaganda. The Congress reacts when the appropriations and information are integrated into a program. Should that program include the administration of information and appropriations which the Congress has not approved, it is a violation of principle.

CHAPTER V FOOTNOTES

[1]James L. McCamy, Government Publicity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), p. 8.

[2]U.S. Congress, House, Hearings, Subcommittee on Publicity and Propaganda, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947. House Report No. 1073, July 24, 1947.

[3]80 Stat 688, H.R. 14921.

[4]Densmore to Creel, Mar. 21, 1919, CPI Mss., Series CPI 1-A1, Box 1.

[5]The respective laws for the appropriate sections of Titles 44 and 5 are Pub L 90-620 (1968) and Pub L 89-554 (1966).

[6]U.S. Congress, House, Hearings, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, on H.R. 1600, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, p. 6.

[7]18 U.S.C.A. 1913.

[8]Hearings, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, p. 6.

[9]Ibid., p. 28.

[10]Ibid., p. 32.

[11]Ibid., p. 6.

[12]Ibid., p. 30.

[13]18 U.S.C.A. 1913.

[14]105 F.S. 257; 71 S. Ct. 669.

[15]Refers to the review by Justices Stone, Douglas and Frankfurter. A future member of the Court, James F. Byrnes, was senior minority Representative of the Appropriations Committee on May 29, 1919.

[16]18 U.S.C. 201 (1940).

[17]U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings, Maintenance of a Lobby to Influence Legislation, pursuant to S. Res. 92, 63rd Cong., 1st sess., (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1913), Vols. 1-5. (Hereafter Hearings, Lobby Investigation.)

[1] James E. McCarthy, Government Publicity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 6.

[2] U.S. Congress, House, Hearings, Investigation of Publicity and Propaganda, 60th Cong., 1st sess., 1917, House Document No. 1017, July 24, 1947.

[3] 40 Stat 449, R.C. 10613.

[4] Ordinance to Crowd, Wis., Ct., 1920, CPI Wks., Series CPI 1-A1, Box 1.

[5] The retrospective laws for the electorate sections of 10113 44 and 7 are Pub L 80-620 (1948) and Pub L 90-514 (1968).

[6] U.S. Congress, House, Committee, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, 60 U.P.: 1900, 60th Cong., 1st sess., 1944, p. 9.

[7] 18 U.S.C.A. 1914.

[8] Hearings, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, p. 9.

[9] Ibid., p. 28.

[10] 7142., p. 32.

[11] 1011., p. 9.

[12] 1012., p. 50.

[13] 18 U.S.C.A. 1913.

[14] 105 F.1. 257; 71 S. Ct. 624.

[15] Letters to the Review by Justices Stone, Douglas and Frankfurter. A Future Member of the Court, Irene T. Tyrne, was senior minority Representative of the Oppression Committee on May 17, 1919.

[16] 18 U.S.C. 201 [1940].

[17] U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings, Maintenance of a Lobby to Influence Legislation, Pursuant to S. Res. 92, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., [Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1913], Vols. 1-5. Thereafter Hearings, Lobby Investigation.

[18]H. H. Wilson, Congress: Corruption and Compromise, (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1951), p. 13.

[19]Hearings, Lobby Investigation, p. 3.

[20]S. Res. 92, 63rd Cong., 1st sess.

[21]Wilson, p. 15.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Ibid., p. 16.

[24]Perhaps remembering this experience, it was Garrett who argued against Representative Smith's amendment.

[25]Wilson, p. 20-26.

[26]Ibid., p. 25.

[27]S. 1295, 65th Cong., 1st sess.

[28]S. 1413, 64th Cong., 1st sess.

[29]S. Res. 569, 63rd Cong., 3rd sess; S. Res. 266, 64th Cong., 1st sess.

[30]Hearings, Lobby Investigations, Index.

[31]Ibid., p. 1717 and E 614, E 615.

[32]Ibid., p. 394.

[33]Blair Bolles, Tyrant From Illinois (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1951), p. 130.

[34]Ibid., p. 131.

[35]Wilson, p. 13.

[36]Hannah F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 186.

[37]Ibid., 168-189.

[38]H. W. Fowler, A Dictionary of Modern English Usage, Oxford University Press, U.S.A., p. 80.

[39]Charles A. Beard, New Basic History of the United States (Garden City: Doubleday Co., 1960), pp. 237-239.

[40]Ibid.

12 G. G. Wilson, Congress: Corruption and Compromise, (New York: Holcomb and Company, 1951), p. 13.

19 Overview, Lobby Investigation, p. 2.

20 C. Lee, p. 63, Cong., 1st sess.

21 Wilson, p. 15.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., p. 15.

24 Pressure researching this accusation, it was charged who served against Representative Smith's nomination.

25 Wilson, p. 10-12.

26 Ibid., p. 12.

27 U. 1206, 81st Cong., 1st sess.

28 U. 1413, 64th Cong., 1st sess.

29 U. 101, 307, 81st Cong., 3rd sess; S. Res. 166, 64th Cong., 1st sess.

30 Overview, Lobby Investigation, Index.

31 Ibid., p. 1717 and 1 old, 1 his.

32 Ibid., p. 104.

33 Elmir Waites, Treaty Term Tillicle (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1951), p. 170.

34 Ibid., p. 137.

35 Wilson, p. 12.

36 Joseph P. Pickle, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 128.

37 Ibid., 149-150.

38 E. E. Peeler, A Dictionary of Modern English Usage, Oxford University Press; I.C.C., p. 80.

39 Charles L. Beard, The Basic History of the United States (Garden City: Doubleday Co., 1960), pp. 137-139.

40 Ibid.

[41]Richard B. Morris ed, Encyclopedia of American History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 179.

[42]Ibid.

[43]Ibid., p. 180.

[44]Beard, p. 238.

[45]Morris, p. 277; Lewis A. Froman, Jr., The Congressional Process (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1967), p. 119.

[46]Beard, p. 406-407; Froman, p. 119.

[47]U.S. Congress, House, House Report No. 1073 (July 24, 1947), 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1, 7.

CONCLUSION

The period which included World War I marks the point in time when the term "democracy" found universal acceptance as a moral good. The Wilson Administration had no small part in this development. The question which existed then and still persists is whether democracy is merely a way of making decisions or is somehow the content of those decisions.

Democracy only became an acceptable form of government during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Then, as societies grew in complexity, the possibility of a truly participatory democracy receded. Accordingly, the question became one of the quality of representation. The Athenian example served as an ideal of classical theory; but it could not be applied to increasingly technical and complex societies. The people do nothhave the capability of assembling face to face. They can elect representatives.

The act of election is the process of holding the representative accountable. The representative, once elected, chooses policies which will look good at the next election. Implicit in this procedural argument are several assumptions. There must be a sufficient number of qualified, able men who can stand for office. Politics must be a respectable thing. The range of decisions and choice of

policies must be clear. Otherwise, demagogic overpromising leads to fraud. Lastly, there are limits upon what government can do. Dissenting views must be tolerated until the legislative process has had time to work. Once it has worked, the decision must be accepted by majority and minority alike.

From the perspective of the standpatters, the incumbent administration in 1919 was deficient in all the above respects. The congressional election of 1918 was a general repudiation of the Democratic Party and its policies. That election confirmed and reinforced the standpatters' belief that 1912 and 1916 had been false victories for the Democrats. The defection of the Progressives, based upon a rejection of the majority position, was a corruption of the fundamental political process.

The entire social justice movement of the years previous to the war had labeled representatives as incompetent and corrupt. Beginning with the Overman investigation in 1913, Woodrow Wilson had tacitly embraced that position. The steady investive of the muckrakers had libeled politics as something inherently dishonest.

Progressives generally were responsible for the state of affairs. The voter's choice of policies had been corrupted when the 1910 insurgency had made the party platforms meaningless. Without a clear responsibility vested in the majority party in the House, there was no

accountability to the electorate. The Wilson program, enunciated in idealistic rhetoric, was precisely the over-promising which worked the fraud upon the electorate. The culmination of threats to the representative system was Wilson's 1918 preelection appeal for a sympathetic Congress.

The reaction was not entirely due to partisan politics. Insofar as there is such asthing as a corporate conscience of an institution, the conscience of the United States Congress was offended. But, because the institution of the Presidency commands an almost automatic respect, Wilson was not the explicit target of the reaction. The President, by departing for France and concentrating his attention and interest on Versailles, had in effect removed himself from the hurly-burly, bread and butter issues which were surfacing on the domestic front.

This left the field open to the Congress. The conservatives could dramatize an anti-administration issue by linking the dislocated economy to the bloated federal bureaucracy. Besides the inevitable small injustices perpetrated by petty bureaucrats in all rapidly expanded agencies, there was the spectacular failure of major programs.

The target ultimately was always the administration. The issue would be resolved in 1920. However, it would not be politic to attack an embattled leader in time of adversity. Similarly, it would not be politic to attack

major segments of society by being too explicit in the assault on administration programs designed for those groups.

The attack upon George Creel was for the general issue of partisanship and propaganda. Only the most public errors and personal improprieties were specified during the investigations. To have identified and exploited the activities of the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy would have been counter-productive. Certainly, Creel's activities with the AFL front had partisan advantages. Above the partisan activities, however, was the fact that organized labor was supporting the government, even if it was Democratic. If the connection between labor leaders and government funds had been publicly made, the movement of workers toward the Socialist pacifists or even the militant anti-war IWW might well have accelerated.

The threat of a hostile congressional investigation was always present after November 1918. George Creel's connections were numerous and the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy connection was only one. Like many men who followed him, he ensured that his transgressions of principle were always in the cause of national security. There was no legislative authority for the Committee on Public Information. Only the most enthusiastic supporter would have proposed an appropriation for Creel in 1919.

Accordingly, the conservatives manipulated Creel

as a symbol of the propagandist, the corrupter of language. The objectively beautiful style of Wilson could never subsequently rid itself of the "Creeling" incubus. As events at home and abroad continued to deteriorate, this dichotomy became increasingly clear. The wiser heads among the reactionaries were perhaps pleased that Creel existed.

The subsequent, 1920 investigation of the Committee on Public Information's finances did not surfact the issue of the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy. It was not raised in the 1924 confrontation with Senator Smoot. There are three possible reasons for this. Firstly, the labor situation was still explosive and an investigation of the CPI-AALD would not contribute to conciliation. Secondly, there were no records as reported by the liquidating officers of the Council of National Defense. The surviving drawer at the Archives bears the imprint of the diligent archivist who may have found stray copies in other files of the Committee on Public Information. None of the material is from the New York office. The Council of National Defense, as liquidating authority, would have nothing to gain by submitting an adverse report with such political consequences.

Thirdly, there is the possibility that some members of Congress were well aware of the activities of the Committee on Public Information. There is no evidence to

support this conclusion. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to infer that had the Congress known the full facts, it might well have concurred toward the end of industrial peace. Having tacitly concurred, held hearings, and granted an appropriation, the option of making the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy a public issue later would have been foreclosed. There is, of course, no evidence to support such a conclusion.

George Creel and the Committee on Public Information were a problem which was especially susceptible to immediate legislative solution. The United States Employment Service was not so vulnerable. Formal political and economic relationships had been formed which presented a direct threat to the standpatters' principles. The inclination of organized labor toward the Democratic Party and the Progressives had become evident as early as 1908. The experience of the war had solidified the relation and labor even spoke of debts to be repaid. If the administration guaranteed labor only the gains held at war's end, it would constitute an unforgivable intrusion into the free market. At the other end of the continuum was federal coordination of all workers, government ownership of utilities, and active United States participation in the world's economy.

These policies were quite explicit in John B. Densmore's discussion of the right to employment being above that of schools and roads. The policies were even

more explicit in Roger W. Babson's "Taylorism" of federal "honor" records on all industrial workers. Higher officials, even Wilson himself, moderated the extreme positions. But once set in motion, the publicity machine could not be stopped as the suffragists, Socialists, and strikers raised their demands. There were sound and reasonable intermediate positions such as that taken by the Republican Representative John I. Nolan. However, the incredible meddling in numerous local issues raised the threat of the unaccountable, irresponsible and arrogant bureaucrat. While a representative could support a federal role in employment coordination, he could not vote for the scandal-wracked USES.

The callous disregard for local sensibilities displayed by the USES was made analogous to the suspension of individual rights by the War Department. The simultaneous adoption of the universal draft and the suspension of volunteering went against American traditions. The refusal of Theodore Roosevelt's offer to raise a division and lead it to France drove many Progressives back to regular Republicanism. The activities of the Military Intelligence Service and the CPI alienated liberals and Socialists from any total rapprochement with the Democrats.

Most importantly, the alleged abuses of military justice were calculated to touch the quick of American anti-authoritarianism. The General Staff was stereotyped

as nepotistic, authoritarian, and incompetent--precisely the same image created for the administration. In addition, each passionate plea from an offended AEF doughboy represented an implicit threat against the presidential aspirations of John J. Pershing. Popular here that he was, by September 1919 Civil War veteran Oscar Sherwood wanted an investigation as to whether Pershing had ever even visited the front. Another representative claimed he had used the CPI for promoting his image.

Political conditions being what they were in 1919, it was almost inevitable that the gag law should have been passed. The abuses perceived elicited just such a reaction from a formerly compliant and disorganized Congress. Events had brought a spontaneous, unformed reaction which required only master craftsmen such as Joseph G. Cannon and James R. Mann to fashion into revenge. The standpatters' long memories could not fail to recall that March day in 1910 when they had been humiliated in the name of universalist, humanitarian ideals. By 1919 their enemies were disillusioned and disorganized. Cannon and Mann proceeded quietly, working within the rules of Congress and the mechanism of the Republican Party.

Returning home to the Republican Party was made easy for the Progressives. Considerable criticism of fellow-traveling Republicans was eschewed in order that they might return honorably. Public, partisan positions

Returning home to the Hebrides Tarry was ready to take the responsibility. Presbyterio activities of Falls-threatening importance was confident in order that they elect pastor promptly. Tarry's spiritual qualities

were taken on only the general issues such as executive propaganda, the proliferation of placeholders, and the economy. That left the lobbyists, such as Industry magazine, to fight the publicity battle with the bureaucrats on specifics. This in turn made it easier to be against the Wilson Administration without being for the stand-patters. It was an exploitable consensus, albeit a negative one.

The amendment which was finally passed and signed was simply the explicit enunciation of a principle by the legislative branch. The principle was well understood, even if its application was less clear. The inability to define the dividing line between propaganda and information was a problem then, as now. Similarly, the Congress was unsuccessful in specifying exactly how communications between the executive and the legislative branches should be conducted. There could be no argument upon the principle, and yet the codification thereof eluded the lawmakers.

The statement of the principle, however imprecise, would in most cases be sufficient notice from one branch to another. This is the substance of which most House, Senate, and Joint Resolutions are formed. The communication effected may well be imprecise. The executive branch, nevertheless, is warned that it must cease whatever it is doing. The resolution is usually a notice which precedes

possible further action, such as investigation. This was the sense of Congress to Secretary Wilson concerning Densmore's activities in San Francisco.

Enactment of criminal law communicates a more serious threat. It applies to individuals, not just organizations and institutions. The gag amendment provided for only a misdemeanor offense, but any situation in which it might be invoked would certainly provide for at least political humiliation.

An element of the offense is the misuse of funds. The misdemeanor occurs in a context of communication, the effect of which is the subversion of the representative principle. That imprecision makes improbable any sequence of events which would lead to prosecution. The more definitively explicit the amendment became, the less likely it was to be applied. Compounded with the growth of the federal government and the reassertion of executive initiative since the New Deal, the law, as practical legislation, is reduced to an anachronism. The principle remains. The threat of criminal prosecution and removal also remains. The total effect favors a safe, procedural reliance upon the "official channels" provision of the law by government officers and employees. This was the point raised by Addison T. Smith.

The gag law has certainly not had the effect its authors intended. Although it is beyond the present scope,

a suggestive line of inquiry would seek to answer whether there was any coincidence in the New Deal programs, the Near vs. Minnesota decision of 1931, and the adoption of the popular title of "gag law." Such an inquiry would be forced to deal with the growth of administrative law and the principle of federal common law.

The passage of the gag law was an early manifestation of reaction against executive abuses of constitutional procedure. The principles were as important as the partisan politics in restoring the legislative branch to its role. The year was one of the most crucial in United States history due to the interpenetration of economic, political, and constitutional issues. In that context, the abuses created a situation in which it was necessary for the Congress to make explicit in law a principle which has always been implicit in democratic and republican theory. The fact that the particular law is imperfect does not invalidate the principle.

The executive's use of crisis expediencies cut deeply through American society in 1919. The programmatic attempt to create new political constituencies was a threat to the existing representative system. The federal government was directly involved in the life of individuals and groups in an unprecedented way. The continued reliance on expedient crisis measures brought a vigorous congressional reaction.

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
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